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Foreword
Representation and Race in America's Volunteer Military
addresses an issue that is as old as civilized society. Who
among the people of a nation should be its "guardians"? Who
should have the right or responsibility for shouldering the burdens
of national defense?
This monograph was originally written in June 1981 and revised
in November 1983. However, portions of the work have been amended
to encompass more recent trends and developments, including the
results of new research. A major section on "Currents of Thought
Through American History" was also added.
The work has never before been presented in its complete
form, though excerpts of the original manuscript appear in the
following publications: M. Binkin and M. J. Eitelberg, with A.
J. Schexnider and M. M. Smith, Blacks and the Military (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1982); M. J. Eitelberg and M.
Binkin, "Military Service in American Society," in Toward a Cons-
ensus on Military Service , A. J. Goodpaster, L. H. Elliot, and J.
A. Hovey, Jr., eds. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon Press, 1982);
Department of Defense, Population Representation in the Active
Duty Military Services , Fiscal Year 1984 (Washington, D.C.: Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations,
and Logistics], June 1985); and M. Binkin and M. J. Eitelberg,
"Women and Minorities in the All-Volunteer Force," in The
All-Volunteer Force After a Decade , W. Bowman, R. Little, and G.
T. Sicilia, eds. (Elmsford, N.Y.: Pergamon-Brassey ' s , 1986).
The author expresses his gratitude to the staff of the Defense
Manpower Data Center (DMDC) , under the leadership of Kenneth C.
Sheflen, Director, and Robert J. Brandewie, Deputy Director.
Special appreciation is extended to Helen T. Hagan and to Les W.
Willis of DMDC for their help in obtaining statistics on the
military population.
The manuscript v/as typed by Elizabeth Mitchell and Mary
Ellen Lathrop, who also assisted in arranging the tabular material.
Preparation of this publication was supported in part by the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Force Management and
Personnel) , under agreement with the Navy Personnel Research and
Development Center (NPRDC) and the Naval Postgraduate School.
The author is currently Adjunct Research Professor in the
Department of Administrative Sciences, Naval Postgraduate School,
Monterey, California. The views, opinions, and findings presented
here are solely those of the author and should not be construed
as an official position, policy, or decision of any Government
department or agency, unless so designated by other official
documentation.
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Representation and Race in
America's Volunteer Military
"Representation," it has been said, means more in the United
States than in any other nation. E Plur ibus Unum--From Many
One— is more than just a motto of the Great Seal. It signifies
and typifies the American self-image: a nation where unity can
be achieved amid social and political diversity; where, in a land
of immigrants, people of many backgrounds can live in harmony and
come together for a common cause; and where, in democratic fashion,
the nation's great institutions can be called upon to re-present,
or present again, the varied community interests and character-
istics of the multitude. As Herman Melville wrote in 1849, "Ycu
can not spill a drop of American blood without spilling the blood
of the whole world. . . . No: our blood is as the flood of the
Amazon, made up of a thousand noble currents all pouring into
one. We are not a nation, so much as a world. . . ."-1-
The U.S. Armed Forces have always emphasized the diversity
of their membership. It is in the nature of the military organi-
zation to bring together young men and women from all states and
territories, all major demographic groups and social categories,
all races, religions, and ethnic backgrounds— the "blood of the
whole world"--to serve in defense of the country and its guiding
principles. Popular literature and the mass media have helped to
foster this image of the American military as a sort of miniature
melting pot, or perfect blending of all distinctive traditions
and cultural patterns. Moreover, the recent spread of interest
in military "representation" has functioned to convert the image
into a national policy goal.
The seeming paradox lies in the fact that the American Armed
Forces have never been truly representative of the civilian popu-
lation. Conscription has never produced representation in the
military (even though it may be capable of the task). It is even
"Herman Melville, Redburn: His First Voyage (Boston: L. C.
Page & Company, 1924), p. 169.
5
less likely that representation could ever occur under an
all-volunteer format.
Of course, the ideal of a perfectly representative military—
a
so-termed "microcosmic replica" of the general population—is an
illusion. Besides the myriad differences between subgroups within
gross classifications of groups, and subgroups within subgroups of
groups, it is clear that a sample of individuals in any corre-
sponding subdivision of the population would be at least biased by
those who have certain skills, attributes, interests, and person-
ality traits. The ideal of perfect representation within any
highly specialized institution is probably not even desirable.
The case of the lunatic is the favorite example used by political
philosophers to illustrate this point, but there are many others.
2
Nevertheless, direct references to military "representation"
appear in numerous Defense Department studies and reports, state-
ments and testimony by government officials, Congressional and
Executive Department documents, newspaper articles and editorials,
"think-tank" research monographs, popular magazines, academic
journals, public commentary, and general literature in the Social
Sciences. ^ The term has become a permanent part of the military
^There is an opposite view. A former U.S. Senator, for
example, once remarked during the confirmation hearings of a 1970
nominee to the Supreme Court of the United States that Justices
of the Supreme Court should "represent mediocrity." A. H. Birch,
in Representation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971, p. 59),
quotes a similar statement by a British Lord during a television
interview: "Ideally, the House of Commons should be a social
microcosm of the nation. The nation has a great many people who
are rather stupid, and so should the House."
•^Kenneth J. Coffey and Frederick J. Reeg, "Representational
Policies in the U.S. Armed Forces," in Defense Manpower Com-
mission, Staff Studies and Supporting Papers , Vo 1 . 3 : Military
Recruitment and Accessions and the Future of the All-Volunteer
Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1976),
p. D-12. See also Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr.,
"Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer Force, "Armed Forces and
Society 1 (November 1974): 109-122; Alvin J. Schexnider and John
S. Butler, "Race and the All-Volunteer System: A Reply to Janowitz
and Moskos," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Spring 1976): 421-432;
Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional
or Plural," Pacific Sociological Review 16 (1973) : 255-280; Charles
C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Dilemma in Uniform: Race in the
Armed Forces," Annals 406 (March 1973): 94-106; Morris Janowitz,
"Blacks in the Military: Are There Too Many?" Focus 3 (June 1975)
:
3-5; Morris Janowitz, "The Social Demography of the All- Volunteer
Force," Annals 406 (March 1973): 86-93; Morris Janowitz, "The
All-Volunteer Military as a 'Sociopolitical 1 Problem," Social
Problems 2 (February 1975): 432-449; William R. King, Achieving
America's Goals: The All-Volunteer Force or National Service? ,
Report prepared for the Committee on Armed Services, United States
Senate, 95th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1977); Richard V. L. Cooper, Military Manpower
and the All-Volunteer Force , R-1450-ARPA (Santa Monica, Ca. : The
Rand Corporation, September 1977); Mark J. Eitelberg, Evaluation
of Army Representation , TR-77-A-9 (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1977);
Mark J. Eitelberg, "American Youth and Military Representation:
In Search of the Perfect Portrait," Youth and Societ y 10 (September
1978): 5-31; John C. Woelfel and David R. Segal, A Comparison of
Selected Demographic Characteristics of the Army and Civilian
Populations (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the
Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1976); David R. Segal and Eernard
L. Daina, The Social Representativeness of the Volunteer Army ,
Research Memorandum 75-12 (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army Research
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1975); Jerald
G. Bachman, John D. Blair, and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer
Force: A Study of Ideology in the Military (Ann Arbor: The Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1977); David Boorstin, "Volunteer Army,"
Editorial Research Reports 7 (20 June 1975): 443-462; Sar A.
Levitan and Karen C. Alderman, Warriors at Work: The Volunteer
Armed Force (Beverly Hills, Ca.: Sage Publications, Inc., 1977);
Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Enlisted Ranks in the All-Volunteer
Army," Paper Prepared for the Military in American Society Study,
University of Virginia, Charlottesville, Va., January 1978 (Proces-
sed); Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Five Years of
the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978," Armed Forces and Society 5
(Winter 1979): 171-218; Alvin J. Schexnider, "The Black Experience
in the American Military," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Winter
1978): 329-334; Sar A. Levitan and Karen C. Alderman, "The Military
as Employer: Past Performance, Future Prospects," Monthly Labor
Review 100 (November 1977): 19-23; Department of Defense, America '
s
Volunteers: A Report on the All-Volunteer Armed Forces (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower,
Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], 31 December 1978), pp. 35-39;
"Worse Than the Draft," Editorial, New York Times , 26 January
1977, p. A-22; George C. Wilson, "Black Ratio in Army Highest
Ever," Washington Post , 17 October 1976, p. A-2; George C. Wilson,
"Blacks in the Army Increase 50 Percent Since Draft," Washington
manpov/er vernacular, and no discussion of the Armed Forces is
complete today without some mention of social demography, "propor-
tional distributions," or "statistical parity."
Although the concept of military representation is relatively
modern, the basic theory has been a part of political thought for
hundreds of years. 4 Indeed, in this country it has become a
keystone of democracy—an assurance of constitutional behavior
and political equilibrium in the pluralist society—spreading
slowly from the political sphere throughout the social framework
of the nation. In the 1940s, representation theory was applied to
the bureaucracy, and during the 1960s, within the military con-
text. 5 The issue of representation currently manifests itself in
many ways, including numerical hiring and placement policies in
education and employment (such as "affirmative action"); in
"balanced" political party tickets; in public concern over ethnic,
Post , 2 May 1978, p. A-16; "Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?,"
Editorial, Mew York Times , 18 May 1978, p. A-22; "Misgivings
About the Volunteer Army," Editorial, Mew York Times , 2 January
1979, p. A-14; "Who'll Fight for America," Time , 9 June 1980, p.
36; John M. Swomley, Jr., "Too Many Blacks? The All-Volunteer
Force," The Christian Century , 1 October 1980, pp. 902-903;
Military Manpov/er Task Force, A Report to the President on the
Status and Prospects of the All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, November 1982); and numerous other
references in the popular media, academic journals, research
monographs, and government reports.
4 See Mark. J. Eitelberg, Military Representation: The Theoret-
ical and Practical Implications of Population Representation in
the American Armed Forces , Doctoral Dissertation, New York Univer-
sity, October 1979; Hannah F. Pitkin, The Concept of .Representation
(Berkeley, Ca.: University of California Press, 1967); Hannah F.
Pitkin, ed., Representation (New York: Atherton Press, 1969); A.
H. Birch, Representation (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971).
5 J. Donald Kingsley, Representative Bureaucracy (Yellow
Springs, Oh.: Antioch Press, 1944); Harry Kranz, The Participatory
Bureaucracy (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1976); Samuel Krislov,
The Negro in Federal Employment (Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press, 1967); Samuel Krislov, Representative Bureaucracy
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974); William A.
Niskenan, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1971)
.
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racial, and female appointments to public office; in the minority
and women's rights movements; and in symbolic portrayals of the
American people covering everything from war memorials to postage
stamps
.
1. THE CONCEPT OF MILITARY REPRESENTATION: BASIC ISSUES AND
CONFLICTS
At the heart of the issue of military representation in this
country is the concept of the "citizen soldier" and the democratic
imperative, asserted by George Washington, that "every Citizen who
enjoys the protection of a free Government, owes not only a pro-
portion of his property but even of his personal services to the
defence of it. . . ." D In fact, from the armies of the Roman
Republic through the French levee en masse and post-Revolutionary
thought in America, to the present-day controversy over voluntary-
recruitment, it is the idea that all citizens share an equal
responsibility of service to the nation that underpins the funda-
mental principle of proportional participation.
The importance attributed to various themes or elements of
military service ordinarily shifts together with changes in the
political and social setting. Since 1945, for example, manpower
issues have focused on national security, budgetary considerations,
"7
and practical expediency (that is, compulsory service). "Equality
of service" grew out of the citizen-soldier concept around the
period just prior to World War I; yet, before the 1960s, equity was
seldom ever a major factor in manpower policy decisions. A
combination of civil rights and antiwar protests, "quota
°George Washington, "Sentiments on a Peace Establishment" in
Walter Millis, ed., American Military Thought (Indianapolis:
Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1966), p. 23.
7
'See James L. Gerhardt, The Draft and Public Policy (Columbus:
Ohio State University Press, 1971).
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consciousness," and public response to inequities in the Selective
Service System led to extensive draft reform, the draft lottery,
and the eventual demise of conscription. At the same time, as a
result of these social forces, a new public awareness of the
military establishment developed— an awareness and interest in
the means as well as the outcomes of defense manpower policy.
Furthermore, it was a concern for the social consequences of
manpower policy decisions that helped to reshape methods of
recruitment and to popularize the concept of "military represen-
tation."
"Representation," some thus contend, can provide a definitive
answer to the longstanding question: "Who shall serve when not
all serve?" Fairness can be assured to the extent that the few
who do serve in the military compose a cross section of all who
are equally obligated to defend the nation; and one can assume
that military responsibilities are distributed impartially across
all sectors of society when identified groups are present in
proportion to their presence in the total population—that is,
when membership of the military is mathematically similar in some
way to the nation's citizenry.
Equity issues are by far the most commonly discussed feature
of participation in the present all-volunteer military. This is
largely the result of the highly disproportionate percentage of
blacks in the Army and, to a lesser extent, the perceived differ-
ences in the social class distribution of the enlisted force and
the general population. Ironically, while the exclusion of blacks
from the military ignited modern discussion of "equality of ser-
vice," it is their o ve
r
representation that dominates most
commentary today. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, however,
the burdens of military service were seen to outweigh the benefits,
and equal opportunity gave way to "equal representations-protect-
ing the disadvantaged and certain depressed minority groups, such
as blacks, from bearing a disproportionate burden of the defense
of the nation.
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Concepts regarding the political legitimacy of the American
Armed Forces also involve issues of military representation. The
general principle of a citizen's obligation to serve in the
military is still a popular and controversial topic of debate.
Borrowing from a classic theory of accountability in government,
the "subjective" (or "informal internal") model of military
accountability suggests that population diversity , or a balanced
mix of civilian-community values, can provide a naturally effec-
tive means of legitimate direction and control. The "subjective"
model appears as a recurrent theme in academic research, despite
the fact that methods for evaluating the direct consequences of
representation have always been problematic. Most treatments of
the relationship between population participation and account-
ability within the military organization continue to center on
standard demographic characteristics, but there is a growing
tendency to place greater emphasis on the significance of personal
attitudes
.
Military representation, especially when it pertains to
elements of individual "quality," is often linked with military
effectiveness . When the modern draft ended, there was no yardstick
for assessing the aggregate degree of quality possessed by new
enlistees. The aptitude test scores and educational level of the
draft-era force were at first accepted as the criteria of recruit-
ing success under the new, all-volunteer system--mainly because
the draft offered a visible reference point and, so many believed,
all-volunteer recruitment had to prove it could at. least match
the draft in this respect. Eventually, the national population
of military-age youths became the sacred touchstone for appraising
recruit attributes; and quality representation—that is, having
no less than the national proportion of high school graduates and
no lower than the national average score on the military's aptitude
test--was equated with the minimum needs of the Armed Forces.
It is not clear that quality representation per se affects
overall military performance or organizational efficiency. The
disproportionate representation of persons with certain social
11
and economic characteristics, on the other hand, may adversely
influence the effectiveness of the force. Empirical research on
this subject is insufficient. In any case, there are several
thought-provoking theories of the potentially harmful consequences
of socioeconomic imbalances, and they have contributed to public
apprehension about all-volunteer participation.
Thus, expressions of concern regarding the membership compo-
sition of the American Armed Forces have focused on three general
areas of national policy: social equity
, political legitimacy ,
and military effectiveness . Just the same, these various expres-
sions of concern are not founded on indisputable, axiomatic truths.
Value conflicts both between and within these three categories
are quite prevalent. Each theme is heavily value-freighted,
containing a variety of possible meanings and measures, along
with a full range of equally justified, yet essentially opposed,
arguments. The result is a hodge-podge of representation theory,
a conglomeration of naysayers and advocates with no particularly
distinct political or ideological linkages, much normative joust-
ing, and little solid evidence.
The knottiest value conflict today may be found in the so-
called "benefits vs. burdens" controversy. Equity perceptions are
strongly influenced by the assumed ratio of benefits to burdens
in military service. When the burdens of enlistment are seen to
outweigh the benefits, attention is focused on social class
distinctions; and, any overrepresentation of economically disadvan-
taged individuals is viewed as evidence of some injustice.
Conversely, when the benefits of military service overbalance
perceived burdens, it has been suggested that the achievement of
true social equity occurs through the over representation of the
disadvantaged poor and racial minorities.
Added to this is the understanding that "benefits" and "bur-
dens" are themselves subjective, culture-bound concepts, which
may bear no relationship to the conditions of war or peace. For
example, in the history of this nation, immigrants, the sansei
(during World War II), and blacks have placed great importance on
12
the "right to fight" and wartime service; exclusion from combat
duty was a denial of full citizenship and, therefore, equality.
At the same time, in the absence of conflict and compulsory ser-
vice—with opportunity for technical training, education, social
development and mobility, personal fulfillment, job experience,
fair compensation, and steady employment—military membership is
described by some in largely negative terms. In fact, present
discussions of representation in the all-volunteer military have
not concentrated on disproportionate black enlistments because
whites are being denied a just share of the benefits—but, rather,
because depressed minorities are viewed as victims of a system
that forces them to carry an unjust share of the burdens to obtain
the benefits.
Moreover, because the all-volunteer military is portrayed by
some as an "employer of last resort"— a haven for life's assorted
losers— it is failing to advance or improve its attraction for a
wider cross section of society. The resocialization of poverty
youths, it is said, depends on public acceptance of the military
as a legitimate activity for everyone , not just special segments
of the population. 8 So, even though the disadvantaged can find
some sort of temporary relief in a military job, the full value
of any opportunities for these young people may be lost without
cross-sectional representation.
Yet another area of conflict is found between the objectives
of equal opportunity and proportional representation. "Equal
opportunity" (treating everyone alike) and representation are
often associated with particular minority groups, women, and the
struggle for civil rights. But equal opportunity is a concept
that relates to the individual : rights attach to the individual,
and individual opportunity, as opposed to group opportunity,
means that all persons are judged solely on the basis of their
personal qualifications. Representation conversely classifies
individuals according to groups; it draws attention to stereo-
8Moskos, "The Enlisted Ranks," p. 57.
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typical qualities as people are placed in statistical categories
based on distinctive group traits or identifiable characteristics;'
and it encourages, rather than obviates, consciousness of innate
group differences.
"Political legitimacy" stands out as one of the oldest, most
deeply rooted themes of military representation. Compulsory
service follows on the heels of legitimacy arguments, since it is
the only manpower recruitment system capable of ensuring universal
citizen participation. But, conscription violates the standard
of free choice; and forms of conscription in this country have been
characteristically unfair, drawing from limited, nonuniversal
manpower pools.
Theories of political legitimacy are at least as old as the
birth of the nation. Nevertheless, an array of exclusionary prac-
tices, inequitable standards, and quotas have historically pro-
hibited military participation by people in certain identified
groups. Black Americans, for example, were restricted from full
participation and subject to special enlistment quotas until only
about thirty years ago. Participation by women is presently
regulated for the stated purposes of military effectiveness and
practical necessity (the same reasons once given for limiting
participation by blacks). At any rate, the special exclusion of
women implies that women are "second-class" citizens, and it is
difficult to argue that political legitimacy objectives—or uni-
versal citizen service— can ever be fully realized unless women
are treated and accepted in the Armed Forces on an equal basis
with men.
The sociopolitical environment and a complex of value judg-
ments affect popular perceptions of representation. These percep-
tions in turn influence the choice of statistics for comparison
and subsequent appraisals of the military's membership. The
current controversy over the representativeness of the volunteer
force illustrates how certain views concerning the military orga-
nization may guide assessments of recruiting results. The "occupa-
tional model" of the volunteer military, for example, suggests
14
that the distinction between enlisted and officer positions in
the Armed Forces is analogous to the distinction between blue-
collar and white-collar jobs in the civilian sector. On the
other hand, the "institutional model," which describes military
service as a universal obligation of citizenship (or a "calling"),
sets the Armed Forces apart from civilian working life and does
not separate the organization along occupational or class lines. 9
Obviously, the social demography of the civilian labor force and
its various subdivisions differs from that of the general popula-
tion (especially among the younger, so-called military-age
population) ; and studies of military representation will clearly
yield different results when, say, enlistees are compared with
civilian blue-collar workers instead of young adults in the
national population. Entirely oppos ite conclusions can thus
result in evaluations of the same military data--depending on how
one sees the military (or defines its purpose) and selects the
various population standards for comparison.
Military "effectiveness" likewise involves a set of goals
that conflict with representation. Perfect representation, for
instance, would require that the military duplicate the educational
levels, aptitude distribution, physical attributes, and moral
profile of the general population— enlisting the services of some
people v/ho are now found mentally, medically, or morally unfit.
But military manpower managers seek to recruit candidates on the
basis of their qualifications, not representation; qualified
individuals make good soldiers or sailors, it is said, because
they are qualified. Efficiency, performance, t rainabil i ty
,
discipline, motivation, leadership, and the like are the criteria
military managers use to evaluate force ability. The Services
thus strive to recruit "the most of the best" young men and women
during any given year, while military needs are used to justify
y The "institutional vs. occupational" formulation is attri-
buted to Charles C. Moskos. See, for example, Charles C. Moskos,
Jr., "From Institution to Occupation: Trends in Military Organi-
zation," Armed Forces and Society 4 (Fall 1977): 41-50.
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the "quality mix" of enlistees as well as the standards for
selection and placement.
It is important to understand that the goals of military
effectiveness are tied to the goals of equity and legitimacy. As
an agent of the government, the military must comply with the
requirements for equity, and it must obviously be held to legiti-
mate direction and control. Just the same, in order to effectively
protect and defend these national guiding principles, the military
must fulfill its own peculiar organizational requirements. Hence,
there is the classic confrontation between means and ends:
military effectiveness requires that certain standards be used to
pick the best candidates and make suitable job assignments;
however, national principles and priorities simultaneously demand
that the Armed Forces do all in their power to be a reflection or
microcosmic image of society.
A reasonable balance of opposing objectives may be the only
way to reconcile differences between benefits and burdens, internal
organizational needs and external national goals, equal opportunity
and proportional representation, compulsions and freedoms, and
other areas of variance. A trade-off or compromise is similarly
needed to settle fundamental conflicts between equity, legitimacy,
and effectiveness. And7 yet, any attempt to bridge the gap between
clashing principles (philosophical or practical) will call for
its own healthy share of subjective interpretation. After all,
how does one strike a balance between realistic military needs or
requirements and the recognized social good? Can one, or should
one, even attempt to balance and trade between separate categories
of demands on the nation and the body politic? Indeed, what is
"reasonable"?
These are all questions that have characteristically followed
the history of manpower policy and race relations in the American
military
—
questions that may well be as old as the very origins
of organized armies. During the past few years, the search for
10 See Eitelberg, Military Representation .
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an equitable and effective recruiting policy has been urged on by
the swelling proportion of blacks and other minorities in the
Armed Forces. At the same time, a new awareness of the interrela-
tionship between the military and society has helped to draw the
lines of discord between the proponents of conscription and the
defenders of voluntary service. The military has 'thus become a
symbol of the society, a manifestation of equity; and as a public
institution, its composition is seen to symbolically reflect
social justice or injustice.
Ironically, while the under representation and exclusion of
blacks from the military ignited modern discussions of equality
of service, it is their over representation that dominates debate
today. "Equality of service" once meant getting blacks into the
Armed Forces; now it has come to mean, benignly, keeping blacks
out .
2. FACIAL REPRESENTATION IN AMERICA'S VOLUNTEER MILITARY
There were various references to the potential "problems" of
participation by blacks during the early days of the All-Volunteer
Force (AVF) debate; but it was the final report of the President's
Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force (or the "Gates Commis-
sion") and its treatment of "objections against the AVF" that
provided the first official government acknowledgment of the
"representation" matter. The Gates Commission report highlighted
several contemporary issues that were directly related to questions
of "complete" citizen participation— including the "frequently
heard claim that a volunteer force will be all black or all this
or all that." 11
The Commission's "best projections for the future" were that
blacks would constitute 14.9 percent of enlisted males in the
entire military, and that the proportion of black enlistees in
-^President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force,
The Report of the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer
Armed Force (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1970), p. 15.
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the Army would be approximately 18.8 percent by the year 1980. 12
"To . be sure, these are estimates," the Commission asserted, "but
even extreme assumptions would not change the figures drasti-
cally."-1-^ The Commission left little room for doubt.
If the proponents of voluntary service had not been so
emphatic in their predictions of "proportional representation"
under the new all-volunteer system, perhaps the reactions of
critics and skeptics would not have been so severe. Ey the end
of 1974, it became obvious that certain social categories were
not enlisting in the military at predicted levels; and the "broad
appeal" of military service, it appeared, did not extend quite as
far as many Defense analysts and AVF partisans had originally
envisioned. The most conspicuous statistic was the sudden leap in
the proportion of black enlisted accessions in the Army.
During the phase-out of compulsory service, the relative
number of black volunteers increased steadily, though slowly. In
Fiscal 1974, however, the proportion of black recruits in the
Army jumped unexpectedly to an unprecedented high of 27 percent
—
almost double the proportion of black Army recruits in 1970, the
year the Gates Commission predicted that "the composition of the
military will not be fundamentally changed by ending conscrip-
tion, "l^ i n fact, all Services displayed increases in the number
of blacks, as the proportion of new recruits who were black went
from 13 percent in 1970 to 21 percent just four years later. 15
The situation was described in a Congressional Research
Service publication:
i2 Ibid., p. 147
l 3 Ibid., p. 15.
i4 Ibid.
1JKenneth J. Coffey et al., "The Impact of Socio-Economic
Composition in the All-Volunteer Force," in Defense Manpower
Commission, Staff Studies and Supporting Papers , Vol. 3: Military
Recruitment and Accessions and the Future of the All-Volunteer
Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, May 1976), p.
E-12.
DoD has repeatedly stated that it is not
concerned with the racial breakdown of the
Armed Forces and regards any action taken to
limit enlistments by race as a violation of
the concept that each individual must be
measured on his own worth regardless of color.
Congress, however, continues to be concerned
that the Armed Forces may be becoming dispro-
portionately composed of individuals who have
lower socio-economic status or who are members
of racial/ethnic minorities . 16
The Defense Manpower Commission was created by Congress in
1973 and directed to conduct a comprehensive study of the overall
manpower requirements of the Department of Defense, including
"the implications for the ability of the Armed Forces to fulfill
their mission as a result of the change in the socioeconomic
composition of military enlistees since the enactment of new-
recruiting policies provided for in Public Law 92-129 and the
implications for national policies of this change in the composi-
tion of the Armed Forces."-1-' About . the same time, the Department
of Defense was instructed by the Senate Armed Services Committee
to perform a continuing study of "population representation" in
the military and report its findings to Congress at the end of
each fiscal year.-*-"
During the past few years, the "representation" issue has
come to be associated primarily with the overrepresentation of
16 See Robert L. Goldich, "All-Volunteer Military Force,"
Issue Brief Number IB73021 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional
Research Service, Library of Congress, 1973), p. 4.
1 7
-1-
'Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower: The Keystone
of National Security (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
April 1976)
, p. 156.
The Congressional directive appears in Senate Armed Services
Committee Report Number 94-884, May 1974. See Department of
Defense, Population Representation in the All-Volunteer Force
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
[Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics]; [Manpower,
Installations, and Logistics]; and [Force Management and
Personnel] , 1974 to present)
.
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blacks in the Army. ^ of course, participation by blacks is one
of the oldest, most enduring military manpower "problems." But the
recent interest is perhaps best explained by the fact that the
steadily rising level of black enlistments accompanied the removal
of certain Selective Service controls over the social composition
of the military--cont rols which, in one form or another, had
always been accessible during the short history of an integrated
force
.
As Table 1 shows, all Services entered the 1980s with a
greatly increased proportion of black personnel. In the Army,
the proportion of blacks increased with each successive year
during the 1970s. At the end of Fiscal 1983, almost one out of
every three soldiers was black— three times the percentage of
blacks in 1949, the year before the Army submitted a plan to remove
its racial quota. Blacks constituted lower proportions in the
other Services; still, close to 20 percent of all those on active
duty were black, a proportion substantially greater than the
architects of the all-volunteer military had ever anticipated.
The year 1980 was used by the Gates Commission research
staff as a focal point for its manpower projections. The Commis-
sion staff estimated the future participation of blacks in the
new AVF by examining the projected pool of young men available
for military service, the proportion of young men able to pass
mental and physical standards, first-term participation rates,
and reenlistment behavior. The Commission's projections ("best
estimates") were based on the assumption that (1) the projected
proportion of black young men available for military service
would increase (in comparison with a lower rate of growth for the
pool of v/hite youths) ; (2) the proportion of black males qualified
for military service would rise from 53 percent to 63 percent;
(3) the effect of a 40-percent pay increase on black participation
rates would be smaller (by a factor of 0.25) than the effect on
white participation rates (because "a larger proportion of the
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qualified black population is willing to serve at today's relative
pay level"); and (4) black r eenl istments would mirror the
first-term reenlistment decisions of Air Force personnel who
entered military service between 1963 and 1966.™ in addition,
the Commission assumed that just over two-million men would be in
the enlisted force of the post-Vietnam military.
As seen in Table 2, the all-volunteer military of 1980 was
composed of almost a half-million fewer male enlistees than the
Commission had forecasted a decade earlier. Moreover, even with
the reduced force, the proportion of black enlistees in all com-
ponents was underestimated. The difference between the actual
and projected proportion of blacks in the Marine Corps was moder-
ately large; in the Navy, the difference was relatively small;
and, in the Air Force, it was negligible. But, in the Army, the
removal of conscription combined with other factors to create a
racial mix of soldiers that had been considered unlikely to occur
even under the most "extreme assumptions."
The fact that the Gates Commission was so incorrect in its
projection of the racial composition of the Army helped to push the
black "representation" issue to the forefront of the continuing
debate over all-volunteer recruiting. The gross miscalculation
also stimulated many critics of the AVF to examine more closely
the full range of potential problems previously dismissed by
Commission analysts.
Renewed interest in the "black problem" was stirred as well
by similar changes in the Reserves. The Gates Commission "recog-
nized from its first meeting the need for special attention to
the problem of the reserve forces." 2 ! The focus of apprehension
centered mainly on the relationship between Reserve enlistments
and the draft. Throughout the Vietnam era the Selected Reserves-
used to supplement the active duty forces, help maintain domestic
20 President ' s Commission on An All-Volunteer Armed Force,
Report , p. 146.
21 Ibid., p. 95.
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TABLE 2
Racial Composition of the All-Volunteer Force
(Male Enlisted Personnel) During 1980:
Gates Commission Projections vs. Actual Experience 3
Whiteb Bl<ack Total
Service
Number Percent Number Percent Numb e r Percent
Army
Actual 362,207 67.8 197,446 32.2 612,367 100.0
Proj ected 671,250 81.2 155,850 18.8 827,100 100.0
Navy
Actual 380,343 88.7 48,304 11.3 428,647 100.0
Proj ected 476,050 91.8 42,550 8.2 518,600 100.0
Marine Corps
Actual 127,343 77.6 36,725 22.4 164,068 100.0





340,261 84.1 64,544 15.9 404,805 100.0
47 6,200 85.2 82,700 14.8 558,900 100.0
Actual 1,262, 868 78.5 347, 019 21 .5 1,609, 887 100 .0
Projected 1,778. 650 85.1 310, 750 14 .9 2,089, 400 100 .0
S ources
:
President s Commission on an All -Volunteer Armed Force , The Report of
the President '
s
Commission on an All--Volunteer Armed F orce (New Yo-rk:
Collier Books/The Macmillan Company, 1970), pp. 146-147. Data on the
active force were provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
The Gates Commission (President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force)
projections were "best estimates" computed in 1969 and based on assumptions
that the proportion of black males qualified for military service would rise to
63 percent and that the effect of a first-term military pay increase (40
percent) would be smaller for blacks than for whites. The highest estimate
for the proportion of blacks in the All-Volunteer Force (16.0 percent for total
Department of Defense) assumed that the effect of a pay increase would be the
same for both races. "Actual" percentages were calculated as of September 1980.
The Gates Commission projections of racial composition identify only white and
black races. However, data show that the Services actually had the following
proportion of "other" races in 1980: Army, 4.1 percent; Navy, 6.6 percent;
Marine Corps, 2.4 percent; Air Force, 3.8 percent; and All Services, 4.5
percent. For the purpose of this comparison, however, "other" races are included
with whites for data on the actual composition of the male enlisted force
during 1980.
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peace, and assist in time of civil disaster—were a haven for
white young men who wanted to avoid being conscripted. Most
people failed to notice the very small proportion of blacks serving
in the Selected Reserves, since it was only a minor symptom of
the much larger problem of an inequitable draft.
It can be seen in Table 3 that the proportion of blacks in
the Selected Reserves increased in parallel fashion with changes
in the active force. Unlike the active military, at the end of
Fiscal 1983 blacks were still yynder represented in two reserve
components, and the upward trend of black participation appeared
to have slowed considerably. Yet the changes were, first, not
anticipated, and second, in an opposite direction from the per-
ceived "norm."
A closer look at the recent recruiting experiences of the
Army reveals that the proportion of black recruits reached a peak
of around 37 percent in 1979, almost three times the proportion of
blacks in the general youth population. ^ In 1980, enlistments
^According to 1980 data compiled by the Bureau of the Census,
approximately 13 percent of the U.S. population (between the ages
of 18 and 24 years) is black. It should be pointed out, however,
that statistical comparisons between military and civilian
populations to determine "representativeness" are not always
consistent. Conventional studies of population "representation"
in the American Armed Forces use the general population (segmented
by race, age, and sex) as the standard or reference population.
But, various groups can be used as the national civilian standard
for comparison (for example, the civilian labor force or its
divisions, the population which served during the draft, the
general population of military-age youth, the general population,
qualified eligibles, or high school graduates); and various aggre-
gations and combinations of groups from the Armed Forces can be
used for proportional measurement from the entire Department of
Defense down to the smallest identifiable unit (for instance,
total Armed Forces, separate Services, recent accessions, total
force, total enlisted force, the officer corps, males only, occu-
pational specialties, broad skill groups, the geographical distri-
bution of personnel according to branch units and echelons, the
general distributions of group members by rank within units or
subdivisions of units to the smallest level of an infantry platoon
or squad) . It has even been suggested that standards for compar-
ison be drawn from the conscripted forces of earlier years, though
this is not a truly representative configuration of the American
24
TABLE 3


















Source: U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services,
Hearings on Military Posture and H.R. 5068: Department of Defense
Authorization for Appropriations for FY 1978 Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 1187; Robert L. Goldich, "Military
Manpower Policy and the All-Volunteer Force," Issue Brief Number IB77032
(Washington, D .C . : The Library -of Congress, Congressional Research
Service, 3 December 1980); and data provided by the Defense Manpower
Data Center.
Army Marine Air Air
Fiscal Nat ional Army Naval Corps Nat ional Force
Year Guard Reserve Reserve Reserve Guard Reserve
1971 1.2 2.2 2.0 3.2 1.0 2.8
1972 2.0 2.9 3.0 7.4 1.4 3.3
1973 3.2 5.6 3.5 12.6 2.0 4.2
1974 5.6 7.2 3.4 11.6 2.9 5.6
1975 7.2 11.1 4.4 14.1 3.8 8.1
1976 10.6 14.8 5.4 15.4 4.8 9.7
1977 14.5 19.6 5.9 18.0 5.7 11.8
1978 16.5 21.6 5.9 19.3 6.4 13.2
1979 16.9 23.3 6.7 20.1 6.8 14.0
1980 16.7 23.6 7.1 19.9 7.1 14.3
1981 16.6 23.9 7.9 19.8 7.3 14.7
1982 16.7 23.1 8.3 18.7 7.3 14.6
1983 17.8 22.6 8.3 18.4 7.2 14.5
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of blacks dropped somewhat, followed by a sharp decline in each
of the three succeeding years. Ey Fiscal 1983, blacks constituted
less than 18 percent of all recruits and about 22 percent of nev;
enlistees in the Army. In fact, in absolute terms, substantially
fev/er blacks entered the Army during 1982 or 1983 than in any
one-year period since the end of conscription, and fewer black
males than since the early 1960s.
Recent research emerging from the Defense Department's "Pro-
file of American Youth" study has underscored the importance of
the military as an employer of young blacks over the past several
years. J Statistics on military participation show that at least
20 percent of all black males born between 1957 and 1962 had
entered the Armed Forces by September 1983, compared with just 13
percent of white males in the same age group. The contrast appears
even sharper when one considers the fact that blacks are two- to
three-times more likely to qualify for enlistment. For example, by
conservative estimate, over 4_6 percent of all potentially qualified
black males had enlisted by the end of Fiscal 1983. The comparable
people. Another case is often made for using Fiscal 1964 as a
"base" year or benchmark for comparison, since it was both pre-AVF
and the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam. Since
officers tend to differ markedly from enlisted personnel (as
civilian "white collar" workers differ from their "blue collar"
counterparts), the common practice of using only the enlisted
force in comparisons with the general civilian population is
sometimes criticized. For a discussion of the issues and complex-
ities involved in comparisons of military and civilian populations,
see Eitelberg, Military Representation , pp. 26-33, 86-98; Coffey
and Reeg, "Representational Policy," p. D-20; and Cooper, Military
Manpower , p. 205.
9 o
See Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth; 1980
Nationwide Administration of the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude
Battery (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of
Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], March 1982).
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"participation rate" for potentially qualified white males was
less than 16 percent. 24
Once in the military, blacks are more inclined than whites
to choose it as a career. When allowed, blacks have reenlisted
at greater rates than have their white counterparts throughout the
recent recorded history of the Armed Forces. 5 In the Army, for
instance, the reenlistment rates for both first-term and career-
level blacks (v/ho were eligible to reenlist) far exceeded the
comparable rates for whites each year after the end of conscription
(see Table 4). (These statistics are somewhat limited, since
eligibility criteria may not affect both white and black popula-
tions equally.) In fact, the proportion of blacks among all Army
reenlistments doubled between 1972 and 1981, to a point v/here more
than one out of every three was black.
Because the Army requires the greatest manpower and it is
generally considered the least glamorous and attractive branch of
the Armed Forces, it is also the least socially "representative"
Service under all-volunteer recruiting. It is more or less
accepted that the Army will never provide a "perfect portrait" of
society. But, as long as blacks continue to be so overrepresented,
criticisms of the all-volunteer concept (or, for that matter,
whatever system of recruitment happens to be in place) will be
voiced. And present indications are that the proportion of blacks
2^Mark J. Eitelberg, Janice H. Laurence, and Brian K. Waters-;
with Linda S. Perelman Screening for Service (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installa-
tions and Logistics], 1984); M. Binkin and M. J. Eitelberg, "Women
and Minorities in the All-Volunteer Force," in The All-Volunteer
Force After a Decade; Retrospect and Prospect , William Bowman,
Roger Little, and G. Thomas Sicilia, eds. (Elmsford, N.Y.:
Pergamon-Brassey ' s , 1986).
^ 5 See, for example, Department of Defense, "Retention Rates
and Composition of the Male Enlisted Force by Race and Year of
Entry to Active Service as of 30 June 1973," Manpower Research
Note 73-13 (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy Assistant Secre-




Army Reenlis tment Rates, by Race and Career Status,
and the Racial Composition of All Army Reenlistments , 1972-81
Army Reen listment Rates 3 Racial Compos it io
(Percent of El igibl es Who Reen Listed) f Army
Fiscal First -Term C areer
Reen lis tment
s










b 60.9 69.8 78.1 19.9
1974 26.6 43.3 70.4 80.5 77.6 20.9
1975 33.4 54.1 70.3 82.7 74.9 23.5
1976 29.4 42.2 69.1 82.0 71.8 25.9
1977 30.5 48.4 66.3 80.3 70.5 27.7
1978 27.8 47.5 63.4 78.0 68.7 28.7
1979 33.5 53.7 59.6 74.9 63.4 33.4
1980 45.1 65.1 66.3 79.6 60.2 36.1
1981 44.9 66.4 68.0 81.9 57.9 37.5
Source: Derived from data provided by the Department of the Army.
aReenlistment rates for first-term and career eligible persons (consider
qualified and in specified categories for reenlistment) are statistically adjust
to include only those persons scheduled to separate from active duty during t
indicated year.
Reenlistment rates in 1972 and 1973 are for persons who originally entered t
Army as volunteers. In 1972, the reenlistment rates for white and black drafte
were 11.8 percent and 14.8 percent, respectively. In 1973, 10.6 percent of a
eligible first-term white draftees and 12.4 percent of all eligible first-te
black draftees reenlisted.
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in the Armed Forces, especially the Army, will continue to remain
highly over representative as: (1) expanding numbers of blacks
qualify for military service; (2) the proportion of the military-
age U.S. population who are black increases;^ anc3 (3) the national
economic situation, enduring racial prejudice, and other factors
combine to make military service an employer of only resort for
many minority youths.
3. RACIAL REPRESENTATION ISSUES FOR THE 1980S
The popular media offer some indication of the nature and
extent of public concern regarding racial representation in the
military. The New York Times , for example, has repeatedly noted
the "drift toward a heavily black Army" in its criticisms of the
all-volunteer military over the past several years. In May 1978
the Times singled out the "representation" problems of the military
in an editorial entitled "Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?":
It is nov; ah Army with substandard educa-
tion, heavy racial imbalance and a drop-out
rate double that of the draft era (40 percent
of recruits are discharged before completing
their first term of service) .... Eliminat-
ing the Selective Service System has not in
fact eliminated the inequities that helped
spur agitation against the draft during the
Vietnam War. With the sons of the middle
classes deferred for college, Vietnam became
a poor man's war, with disproportionate numbers
of blacks serving in the combat forces.
Recruit pay was quadrupled to increase volun-
teers and, finally, the draft was ended, but
the imbalance was only accentuated. There
are more poor in the Army now, not less. The
percentage of blacks among Army enlisted men
^°It is estimated that the proportion of blacks between the
ages of 18 and 24 will rise to 14.6 percent by the end of the
present decade and continue to increase until 1995 (when over 15
percent of all persons in the age group will be black).- See
Bureau of the Census, Projections of the Population of the United
States: 1977 to 2050 , Series P-25, No. 704 (Washington, D.C.:
Government Printing Office, July 1977), pp. 40-60.
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in 1971 was 13 percent, about the same as in
the nation; it is now double that among Army
recruits. Among officers, the proportion of
blacks is only 6.3 percent. 2 '
Once again, in 1979, the Times expressed its "Misgivings
About the Volunteer Army." "The strength, quality and cost of the
volunteer force are all sources of worry," observed the Times;
but the "more worrisome" problem is the fact that the "Army is no
longer even roughly a cross section of the Nation." Volunteers
"are coming far more heavily from the ranks of the poor, the unem-
ployed and the unde r edu ca t ed than did even the troops in
Vietnam." 28
"The services are growing dramatically unrepresentative of
the nation," a widely-read news journal similarly concludes in a
cover story on the "military manpower crisis." "A number of
military experts argue that while it is true that peacetime service
offers to minorities opportunities for educational and social
advancement, these advantages fade quickly during a war." And,
"the high number of blacks in uniform would inevitably result . .
on
. in a disproportionate number of black fatalities."
"The disproportionate number of poor, uneducated and blacks"
is a "condition that exposes the nation to the charge of turning
over its defense to the most disadvantaged elements of society
while relieving the middle and upper classes from participation
in the dangerous and highly unpleasant business of fighting our
wars," a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff argues in the
27
"Can We Afford a Volunteer Army?," Editorial, New York
Times , 18 May 1978, p. A-22.
zo
"Misgivings About the Volunteer Army," Editorial, New York
Times , 2 January 1979, p. A-14.
29
"Who'll Fight for America? (The Manpower Crisis)" Time , 9
June 1980, p. 25.
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Washington Post . 30 The "ambitious experiment" to maintain a
military force composed entirely of volunteers "has not worked
well," the editors of Time magazine thus conclude. "The racial
balance does not reflect that of the nation. . . ." The draft
should therefore be restored, state the editors, since it would
provide the Army with "a more representative cross section" of
American youth. 31
In early 1979, a New York Times reporter observed that "many
critics, both liberals and conservatives alike, believe that the
military has become totally unrepresentative of American society.
. . . As they do periodically, these criticisms have led to dis-
cussion of reviving the draft. "32 A wide range of periodicals,
popular news journals, and other publications chronicled the
mounting controversy over volunteer recruitment as the nation
entered the 1980s. In characteristic fashion, however, the popu-
larization of defense statistics by both apologists and detractors
of the all-volunteer military often results in partial statements
of recruiting results or, occasionally, in outright errors of fact.
A writer in Sc ience (the respected weekly journal of the
American Association for the Advancement of Science), for instance,
3°Maxwell D. Taylor, "Is the Army Fit to Fight?," Washington
Post , 12 May 1981, p. A-12. In a follow-up article Taylor points
out that one of two "basic defects" of the AVF is "the low or
marginal quality of many recruits and the fact that a dispropor-
tionate number of recruits are poor, uneducated or black."
(Maxwell D. Taylor, "Volunteer Army: Long Enough," Washington-
Post , 16 June 1981, p. A-19). See also two replies to Taylor:
Clifford L. Alexander, "Now is Not the Time to Draft," Washington
Post , 14 May 1981, p. A-21; and Lawrence J. Korb, "Volunteer
Army: It Deserves a Fair Chance," Washington Post , 9 June 1981,
p. A-17.
31"Needed: Money, Ships, Pilots—and the Draft," Time , 23
February 1981, p. 56. In a somewhat different manner, a Washington
Post columnist observes: "Defending the United States is just as
much the responsibility of Nick and Adam as it is of Jose and
Tyrone." (See Mark Shields, "Checkbook Patriotism Won't Do,"
Washington Post , 6 March 1981, p. A-15.)
32Bernard Weinraub, "'National Service'—An Old Idea Gets
New Life," New York Times , 4 February 1979, p. D-4.
31
erroneously stated in 1980 that blacks "now constitute about 30
percent of the armed forces. "33 j n 1981, Time magazine noted
that "the percentage of blacks has risen from 18 percent to 33
percent. "34 j n commenting on the inequity and undemocratic nature
of military membership, a Washington Post columnist observed
around the same time that "in Vietnam, American blacks and Latinos,
who together constitute one-sixth of our local population, sus-
tained 40 percent of all infantry casualties"; and, "today's
all-volunteer army is nearly three times as black as was the 1964
army. "35
Many popular treatments of the Vietnam War give the mistaken
impression that U.S. casualties were heavily concentrated with
racial or ethnic minorities. Actually, during 1965'and 1966 blacks
accounted for close to 21 percent of all combat deaths in Vietnam
(almost double the percentage of blacks in the Army). Eetween
1967 and 1972, however, the proportion of black combat deaths
averaged around 12 percent. By the end of the war, blacks repre-
sented 13.1 percent of all soldiers killed in action36
Furthermore, blacks have never constituted "about 30 percent
of the Armed Forces." At the conclusion of Fiscal 1980, almost
20 percent of all service members (and 22 percent of the military's
rank-and-file) were black (see Table 1). Over the eight-year
33constance Holden, "Doubts Mounting About All-Volunteer
Force," Science 209 (September 1980): 1099.
34"Needed: Money, Ships, Pilots— and the Draft," Time , 23
February 1981, p. 56. The Time essay examines observed problems
in the four Military Services. The implication here is that the
stated increase applies to the military forces in general. No
time period is indicated.
35shields, "Checkbook Patriotism" p. A-15.
36"information Paper: Blacks in Vietnam Conflict , " Department
of the Army, DAPE-KRR, 3 March 1977; and Department of Defense,
Selected Manpower Statistics , pp. 80-85 ("Casualties"). See also
Eli Flyer, "Who Served in Vietnam? Analysis of Factors Associated
with Vietnam Duty Among Army First-Term Enlisted Personnel,"
Manpower Research Note 72-2 (Washington, D.C.: Department of
Defense, Directorate for Manpower Research, January 1972).
32
period of the AVF referenced in the Time magazine article, the
proportion of blacks increased "from 18 percent to 33 percent,"
not in the total Armed Forces, but in the enlisted force of the
Army . According to the Department of Defense, just under 4 percent
of military personnel are Hispanic, and an equal percentage are
categorized as "other" racial or ethnic minorities (primarily
Asian-Americans and Pacific Islanders) . In comparison, the 1980
Census of Population shows that 83 percent of the general popula-
tion is white; blacks comprise almost 12 percent of the population;
and the remaining 5 percent are classified as "other" races.
Between 6 and 7 percent of the general population, regardless of
race, is "Hispanic . "37
In December 1980, the General Accounting Office observed in
a special report that "the increasing debate about the viability
of the All-Volunteer Force has raised many questions concerning
the number and distribution of minorities and females in our
Armed Forces. "38 And: "Because of the increased numbers and
proportions of minorities and females in the Armed Forces and the
possible impact of these changes on manpower effectiveness, the
Congress should be provided more information on this issue. This
will enable the Congress to more fully deliberate the issues and
reach informed decisions concerning the composition of the Armed
Forces and will provide information to the Congress and the public
on a regular basis. "39
It is interesting to note that, over the past few years, most
criticisms of racial representation in the military have been
voiced by a relatively small number of academics, commentators,
legislators, and writers in the popular press. Americans in
37special tabulations provided by the Bureau of the Census,
June 1981.
38ceneral Accounting Office, Minority and Female Distribution
Patterns in the Military Services , FPCD-81-6 (Washington, D.C.:
General Accounting Office/ 18 December 1980), p. 1.
39ibid., pp. 4-5.
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general, according to one survey, do not appear too "concerned"
about the overrepresentation of blacks in the Armed Forces. "It
may be that some military planners have questions about the current
ethnic composition of the Armed Forces," the survey researchers
write, "but the general population does not seem to find it a
problem. Only about 12 percent say there are 'too many 1 blacks,
and these respondents are outnumbered by the 19 percent who say
'too few' and overwhelmed by the 70 percent answering 'right
number '."40 Yet, "American enthusiasm" for a further increase in
the proportion of blacks is "definitely less than for increases
in the proportion of women and Hispanics .
"
41
Of course, the issue of racial representation in the AVF is
more complicated than most popularized accounts suggest. The
tendency here is to lay the blame for any perceived problem
directly on the instrument or machinery of recruiting rather than
on the people or policies involved in its design and operation.
In this manner, the overrepresentation of blacks is regarded as
an inevitable consequence of the all-volunteer method, which is
mistakenly understood to be defective and incapable of ever func-
tioning effectively. At the same time, there is usually an
implicit acceptance that "representation" is right and that it
can be explained quite simply in terms of statistics and mathemat-
ical equations.
Racial participation in the military is affected by the
method or system used to procure new recruits, as experience over
the past decade has clearly demonstrated. But there are also
numerous factors and conditions that promote voluntary service
and individual career decisions, and many of these factors have
little or no connection with the military or the machinery of
recruiting. On the analytical side, too, there is a tangled web
40 James A. Davis, Jennifer Lauby, and Paul E. Sheatsley,
Americans View the Military; Public Opinion in 1982 , Report No.
131 (Chicago: National Opinion Research Center, University of
Chicago, April 1983), p. 43.
41 Ibid., p. 44.
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of practical and theoretical questions that should ultimately be
unraveled and weighed in assessments of "representation."
Race and Equity
The social equity issues that have made military representa-
tion important in the volunteer era are essentially the same issues
that were used to criticize the Selective Service draft of the
1960s. The only difference is the absence of a war, and thus the
absence of statements that the disadvantaged are being employed
as "cannon fodder."
The equity issue was used to argue against the AVF at the
same time it was being used to promote voluntary service. The
basic dissimilarity, however, was that AVF proponents envisioned
a higher form of human justice, a freedom for all from totalitarian
methods and involuntary servitude. As Senator Robert Taft observed
in 1945, the draft "is far more typical of totalitarian nations
than of democratic nations. It is absolutely opposed to the
principles of individual liberty which have always been considered
a part of American democracy. . . . The principle of a compulsory
draft is basically wrong. 2
It is inherently wrong to force anyone into the military,
contended AVF sponsors. Since free choice permits the individual
to maximize his or her own utility, several economists added, the
volunteer system, undercuts any further consideration of equity.
And the argument "that a volunteer army would be a black army, so
it is a scheme to use Negroes to defend a white America" is "sheer
fantasy," Richard Nixon remarked in a 1968 campaign speech. 3
The prevalent view that America's volunteers will consist mainly
of one or another disadvantaged minority "simply has no basis in
42Cited in Harry A. Marmion, The Case Against a Volunteer
Army (Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1971), p. 37.
43Richard M. Nixon, "The All-Volunteer Armed Force" in The
Draft , Gerald Leinwand, ed . (New York: Pocket Books, 1970)
, p. 106.
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fact," the Gates Commission later concluded. "The argument that
blacks would bear an unfair share of the burden of an all-volunteer
force confounds service by free choice with compulsory service." 44
Critics of the AVF maintained that the volunteer system
would be no different from the draft with respect to its effect
on minorities and the poor. "The more fortunate are proposing
that the less fortunate defend the nation," outspoken critic
Harry Marmion claimed. 45 "Among its other significant disadvan-
tages," he wrote, "an all-volunteer army would give rise, at the
enlisted level, to a significantly high proportion of blacks,
poor Appalachian whites, and other working-class groups, particu-
larly in combat units." 46 Just as the draft "economically con-
scripted" the disadvantaged through its inequitable deferment and
induction provisions, the all-volunteer Army was expected to pull
from society the less-skilled and less employable youths who were
"victimized by the vagaries of the economy."
In fact, the image of the Armed Forces as a place of oppor-
tunity, equal acceptance and involvement, regardless of prior
social advantage or pre-existing handicaps, has helped to make
military service a traditional channel for social mobility. The
Services have accepted and even promoted their role as a provider
of advantages for the disadvantaged and equal opportunities for
all. 4 ' According to one study, since 1970 the Army alone has
probably put more energy and resources into efforts to improve
President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Armed Force,
Report , p. 15
45Marmion, The Case , p. 47.
46 Ibid., p. 37.
See Department of Defense, Progress in Ending the Draft
and Achieving the All-Volunteer Force , Report to the President
and the Chairmen of the Armed Services Committees of the House




race relations and equal opportunity than has any other major
A O
American institution. °
The Armed Forces have long been thought of as offering a
"second chance"— a fresh opportunity for education and personal
development— to youngsters from lower-class backgrounds who did
not have access to appropriate schools, and even to middle-class
youths who had access but failed. Since its revolunt ionary
origins, writes Morris Janowitz, the U.S. military forces have
provided these "second chances"; and the number of opportunities
has increased substantially since the end of World War II. ^
"Opportunity" is still the predominant message in military
recruiting advertisements, and there is evidence that many poten-
tial recruits are listening. In 1976-77, a survey of male recruits
in all four Military Services showed that, out of twelve possible
"life goals," "developing your potential" was seen as more achiev-
able through military service than civilian employment— and it
was the second most attractive aspect of enlistment. ° In addi-
tion, out of twelve possible "military attributes," "opportunity
*°Peter G. Nordlie, Measuring Changes in Institutional Racial
Discrimination in the Army , TP-270 (Arlington, Va.: U.S. Army
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, 1975), p. 1. As
Segal and Nordlie also observe, racial inequities still exist in
the Army. But there is evidence that the Army has "made great
strides in reducing inequalities in promotion rates, at most
enlisted ranks, and in most specialties." And "there are indica-
tions that the Army has been responsive to social research pointing
out its discriminatory patterns." See David R. Segal and Peter
G. Nordlie, "Racial Inequality in Army Promotions," Journal of
Political and Military Sociology (Draft; no date)
.
49Morris Janowitz, "Basic Education and Youth Socialization
in the Armed Forces," Handbook of Military Institutions , Roger W.
Little, ed. (Beverly Hills , Ca. : Sage Publications , 1971) , pp. 167-168.
50Department of Defense, Results From the 1976-1977 AFEES
Survey of Male Non-Prior Service Accessions (Alexandria, Va.:
Defense Manpower Data Center, June 1977), pp. 43-44.
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to better myself" was ranked the third most important attribute
by all new entrants. ^1
In the 1979 Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service,
individuals were asked to specify the main reasons why they volun-
teered. The most popular of all reasons for enlisting—selected
by over nine out of ten new recruits—was "better myself in life."
Personal betterment was again mentioned more often than any other
alternative by blacks (40.1 percent) as the most important reason
for joining the military—while most white recruits (34.9 percent)
selected "get training for a civilian job." (Almost 34 percent
of all white recruits selected "better myself in life" and 26
percent of blacks chose "get training for a civilian job" as the
most important reason for enlisting.) About one out of ten blacks
and one out of fourteen whites indicated that "get money for
college education" was their principal motive for joining—whereas
one out of ten whites and one out of fourteen blacks said that
they enlisted primarily to "serve my country."
Historically, minorities have not only sought out the Armed
Forces for increased civil rights and entrance into the larger
society, but also because it is often the best alternative in a
CO
restricted range of economic opportunities. As a military
sociologist notes, it is actually possible for those who are
initially less privileged to compete more realistically for
51 Ibid.
52The 1979 DoD Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service
was administered to enlistees in all four Military Services,
immediately following formal enlistment proceedings, at the Armed
Forces Examining and Entrance Stations (AFEES) . Data collection
took place at all sixty-seven AFEES throughout the nation. The
number of respondents to these questions included over 9,000
white recruits and about 3,300 black recruits. The statistics
presented here were derived from special tabulations provided by
the Defense Manpower Data Center.
53 See Stephen E. Ambrose, "Blacks in the Army in Two World
Wars," in The Military in American Society , Stephen E. Ambrose and
James A. Barber, Jr., eds. (New York: The Free Press/MacMillan
Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 177-191.
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advantages within the military system than in most civilian edu-
cation, commercial, and industrial organizations. 4 Studies have
frequently shown that minorities with less than a high school
education earn more in the military than in the civilian working
rid. Research on veterans and nonveterans also suggests that
ilitary service may provide a "bridging environment" (in the
form of geographic mobility, occupational training, experience
with bureaucratic structures, and personal independence) for the
previously disadvantaged: the Armed Forces prepare and certify
these individuals for jobs in the civilian economy, thus enabling




54 See Charles C. Moskos, Jr., The American Enlisted Man (New
York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), pp. 116-117.
55 See Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Civil,
Traditional, or Plural," in National Security and American Society ,
Frank N. Trager and Philip S. Kronenberg, eds. (Lawrence: Univer-
sity of Kansas Press, 1973), pp. 540-541; and Morris Janowitz and
Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Racial Composition in the All-Volunteer
Force," Armed Forces and Society 1 (Fall 1974): 120.
JU Harley L. Browning, Sally C. Lopreato, and Dudley L. Poston,
Jr., "Income and Veteran Status," American Sociological Review 38
(February 1978): 74-85. See also, for example, Sally C. Lopreato
and Dudley L. Poston, Jr., "Differences in Earnings and Earnings
Ability Between Black Veterans and Nonveterans in the United
States," Social Science Quarterly 57 (March 1977): 750-766;
Wayne J. Villemez and John D. Kasarda, "Veteran Status and Socio-
economic Attainment," Armed Forces and Society 2 (Spring 1976):
407-420; Michael D. Ornstein, Entry into the American Labor Force
New York: Academic Press, 1976); Melanie Martindale and Dudley L.
Poston, Jr., "Variations in Veteran/Nonveteran Earnings Patterns
Among World War II, Korea, and Vietnam War Cohorts," Armed Forces
and Society 5 (February 1979) : 219-243; and Roger D. Little and
J. Eric Fredland, "Veteran Status, Earnings and Race," Armed
Forces and Society 5 (February 1979): 244-260. It should be
pointed out that research into the economic benefits of military
service for veterans is not unanimous on this point. Little and
Fredland ("Veteran Status," pp. 244-245), for example, refer to
several economic studies undertaken in the late sixties and early
seventies that found substantial costs to the individual draftee
(usually over the short term)
.
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During the Vietnam War years, many persons were concerned
that blacks were shouldering a disproportionate share of the
fighting. But, as several observers pointed out, it was the
social and economic inequalities of civilian society that helped
to push blacks into the military. Whitney M. Young, Jr. claimed
in 1967 that the number of blacks and black casualties was high
mainly because blacks enlisted voluntarily , reenlisted, and volun-
teered for hazardous duty." Moskos, in The American Enlisted
Man, attributed the attraction of military service for blacks to
the "push-pull" forces of military and civilian life. "Pushing"
the young black man into the military was the common plight of
blacks in American society. "Pulling" him was the understanding
that the Armed Forces were (and still are) a major avenue of
career mobility that is generally less segregated than civilian
society. 58
Thus, it is the gap between black and white opportunities in
the military and society that helps to make the Armed Forces an
attractive alternative for disadvantaged minorities. Moskos
writes: "It is a commentary on our nation that many black youths,
by seeking to enter and remain in the Armed Forces, are saying
that it is even worth the risk of being killed in order to have a
chance to learn a trade, to make it in a small way, to get away
from a dead-end existence, and to become part of the only insti-
tution in this society that seems really to be integrated." 59
The same general reasons that operate to bring unprecedented
numbers of blacks and other minorities into the military likewise
function to keep them there. One writer observed in 1968 that
the "extraordinary rate of black reenlistment" attests to the
5 Whitney M. Young, Jr., "When the Negroes in Vietnam Come
Home," Harper '
s
, June 1967, p. 66; see also Karl H. Purnell, "The
Negro in Vietnam," The Nation , 3 July 1967, pp. 8-10.
c oJOMoskos, American Enlisted Man , pp. 116-117.
C Q
-^Ibid., p. 133. During the height of the Vietnam War,
Purnell ("The Negro in Vietnam," p. 8) similarly wrote that "many
blacks agree they get better treatment" in the Army.
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fact that the military is, to many blacks, the only way of escaping
from the ghetto; and if there are still remnants of discrimination
and racism in the military it is also the only major institution
in American society that has had a thorough-going integration. .
ft o
. .
" ou in 1967, Whitney Young similarly concluded that blacks
reenlisted in disproportionate numbers "because the Army offers
more opportunity for advancement, for learning skills and using
natural talents, for dignity, for self-respect and a sense of
worth than does the present condition of civilian life." "For
the majority of these capable young men," he wrote, "the Army is
their university."" 1
But these are the general reasons why blacks and other minor-
ities find the military especially appealing. There are, in
fact, more fundamental explanations for the changes in participa-
tion that have occurred over the past decade. The literature en
racial composition, Richard Cooper observes, "reveals a systematic
failure to explore the reasons behind the dramatic increase in
the proportion of . new recruits who are black." Specifically, he
continues, "the increasing percentage of blacks in the enlisted
ranks can be attributed to three principal factors: (1) a dramatic
increase over time in the proportion of blacks found eligible for
military service; (2) particularly high unemployment rates that
plagued the young black population during the beginnings of the
volunteer force; and (3) a lag in earning potential for young
blacks in the civilian work force. ""^
Cooper also attributes rising black participation to the
fact that earned income for blacks in the civilian sector has
decreased relative to the amount that non-blacks could earn since
60 Sol Stern, "When the Black G.I. Comes Home From Vietnam,"
in The Black Soldier: From the American Revolution to Vietnam ,
Jay David and Elaine Crane, eds. (New York: William Morrow, 1971),
pp. 219-220.
OJ
-Young, "Negroes Come Home," p. 66.
62Cooper, Military Manpower , p. 210.
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the early 1970s; at the same time, this has not held true for the
military (assuming equal promotion potential). ^ Another possible
reason, he points out, is that blacks may have been more responsive
to the AVF pay raise in 1971 than the Gates Commission had origi-
nally assumed. 4 In any case, concludes Cooper, "the increasing
number of blacks in the enlisted accession of the 1970s would
probably have taken place even in the presence of the draft ."
And, "some reasonable assumptions regarding the above factors
[entry standards, demographic trends, population eligibility
trends, economic variables, among others] suggest that black
participation in the enlisted forces can be expected to fall
between 15 and 22 percent during. the 1970s and 1980s. . . . Only
under fairly dramatic circumstances, such as a very large increase
in black unemployment rates relative to those for whites, would
we expect the percentage of blacks to fall outside the above
range. "° 5
The factors that Cooper identified as being responsible for
the sudden increase in participation by blacks have changed some-
what since he conducted his analysis in 1976. The difference
between the unemployment rates of white and black youths, for
instance, widened considerably from the late 1970s through the
economic recession of the 1980s. During the summer of 1983, when
the nationwide civilian unemployment rate declined, joblessness
63 Ibid., p. 219.
° 4 Ibid. Cooper finds that one rationale for this can be
found in a logistic supply model, where the pay elasticity reaches
a maximum when the percentage of the cohort volunteering is about
0.4 to 0.5. Based on the assumption that blacks have income
opportunities equal to about 75 percent of those for whites—along
with the fact that a greater fraction of the "prime" black popu-
lation base (than of the white base) were "true volunteers"—Cooper
estimates a pay elasticity (at the draft age) of 1.25 for blacks
and 1.00 for whites. (That is, a 1 percent increase in the ratio
of military to civilian earnings resulted in a 1.25 percent
increase in enlistments for blacks and a parallel increase of 1
percent for whites.)
65 Ibid., pp. 219-220.
42
among black teenagers soared from 48 percent to 57 percent.
Indeed, unemployment among minority youths more than doubled over
the past ten years, and it now stands at levels unparalleled in
history. ° Meanwhile, labor market analysts predict that any
future stabilization or decrease of adult employment in this
country will probably come to some extent at the expense of young
blacks. 67
The proportion of blacks "qualifying" for military service
also increased in the late 1970s, mainly as a result of two
factors. First, the percentage of blacks who completed high
school continued to rise. ° In addition, when the Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) was developed for Defense-wide
use as a single enlistment qualifying exam in 1976, the test was
calibrated incorrectly: upper-ability levels were being accurately
measured (against the standard population "norm"), but scores at
the lower-ability levels were being overstated. The calibration
error was not detected until 1978, and it could not be corrected
before the last few months of Fiscal 1980. 69 Consequently, for a
period of four years and nine months beginning in January 1976, a
considerable number of low-scoring recruits were mistakenly
permitted to enlist.
6
°Ford Foundation, Not Working: Unskilled Youth and Displaced
Adults (New York: Ford Foundation, August 1982), p. 12.
67 See "Black Socioeconomic Gains Eroded in 70's," Public
Administration Times , 15 August 1983, p. 2.
68 In 1970, 79.4 percent of whites and 57.4 percent of blacks
between the ages of 18 and 34 had completed high school. In
1977, it was estimated that almost 84 percent of whites and 70
percent of blacks in the same age group were high school graduates.
See National Center for Education Statistics, Condition of Educa-
tion: 1979 Edition (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1979) .
"^Department of Defense, Aptitude Testing of Recruits , A
Report to the House Committee on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.:
Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower , Reserve
Affairs and Logistics], July 1980).
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In fact, the misnorming episode exercised an enormous impact
on recruiting, as the military accepted almost 360,000 male appli-
cants who had aptitude test scores (subsequently recalibrated)
below the minimum required for enlistment. The numbers varied by
Service, as Table 5 shows, with the Army taking over 200,000
"unqualified" young men, followed by the Air Force (73,538), Navy
(45,384), and Marine Corps (38,884).
Basically, about one out of every four male recruits would
have been disqualified under the aptitude standards applied by
the Armed Forces between 1976 and 1980. Approximately 32 percent
of male recruits in both the Army and the Air Force had test
scores below the minimum levels established by these Services.
About 24 percent of Marine Corps recruits would have been disquali-
fied under the "correct" standards, along with just under 12
percent of recruits in the Navy.
Black young men appear to have been the biggest beneficiaries
of the misnorming episode. In all, over 40 percent of black
recruits during this period had test scores that ordinarily would
have kept them out of the military. Almost 60 percent of black
airmen would have been disqualified, along with relatively large
proportions of black high school dropouts in each of the Services:
ranging from a high of 62 percent in the Army to a low of just
under 30 percent in the Navy. It is not possible to look back
and conjecture about what might have happened to the otherwise
"unqualified" recruits if the misnorming episode had not occurred.
In any event, it is clear that the testing errors touched the
lives of many people, especially young blacks; and it offered
employment, training, and career opportunities to a few hundred-
thousand job-seekers who may never have had those opportunities
without it.
It has been contended by some that the "main cause" of the
expanded participation by blacks was the "vastly larger number of
blacks qualifying for military service. " /u By this argument, the
7fi/uCooper, Military Manpower , p. 221.
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TABLE 5
Percent of Male Recruits Who Would Have Been Disqualified
from Enlisting Under Correct Entry Standards, by Education,
Racial/Ethnic Group, and Service, 1976-80
Education and
Racial/Ethnic Marine Air All Services
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32.0 27.0 34.5 108,051
47.6 51.4 43.3 45,780




















39 73 — 359
Source: Derived from special tabulations provided by the Defense Manpower Data
Center and Mark J. Eitelberg et al., Screening for Service (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installa-
tions, and Logistics], September 1984), pp. 137-152.
aLimited in the following manner by entry standards: In Fiscal 1976, GEDs are
included with high school graduates; in Fiscal 1977, GEDs are included with
either high school graduates (persons 18 years or older) or nongraduates (persons
below 18 years old); and, in November 1977 through March 1979, some GEDs (persons
below 18 years old) are included with nongraduates.
bFor GEDs from September 1979 through September 1980. In January 1976 through
March 1979, some GEDs (persons below 18 years old) are included with nongrad-
uates .
GEDs included with non-high school graduates.
GEDs included with high school graduates.
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proportion of young black males estimated to possess aptitudes in
the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Category I-III range
(above the 30th percentile) jumped from 33 percent in 1972 to 42
percent in 1973, while the capabilities of non-black youths
remained virtually unchanged. This abrupt increase over a single
year was attributed to the changeover by the Army to a new test,
the Army Classification Battery, which eliminated the cultural
bias that was presumably present in earlier tests. There is no
doubt that the aptitude test misnorming of the 1970s played a
powerful role in elevating the "qualifying rates" of minorities.
However, it should be noted that, in contrast to the estimate
that 42 percent of the young black male population in 1973 was in
the AFQT Category I-III range, more recent estimates indicate
that only 27 percent of the current generation of black males
would score in these categories. ±
A combination of varied factors has thus contributed to the
changing racial configuration of the volunteer military over the
past several years. But, while the overall proportion of minori-
ties in the Armed Forces appears to have stabilized, certain
questions of equity remain. One of the more serious issues relates
to the fact that blacks still make up a relatively small fraction
of officers in all four Services—and, certainly, a percentage
that in no way reflects the changes in racial composition which
have occurred in the enlisted ranks. As of September 1983, blacks
comprised 8.6 percent of all officers in the Army; 3.0 percent in
the Navy; 4.3 percent in the Marine Corps; 5.2 percent in the Air
Force; and only 5.8 percent in all Services combined.
71
-"-Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth , p. 71.
By comparison, it is estimated that approximately 78 percent of
white male youths would score in AFQT Categories I-III. It should
be noted that AFQT scores are divided into five categories, from
I (percentile scores of 93 and above) to V (percentile scores of
9 and below) . Scores in Category V disqualify an individual from
military service by law. Persons scoring between the 10th and
30th percentiles (Category IV) are considered by the Services to
generally require a longer period of training and are less produc-
tive on average in jobs calling for a high level of technical skill.
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Black underrepresentation in the officer corps is an area of
major concern to many people; yet, it generally receives much
less attention than black over representation among enlisted
personnel. This may reflect the fact that the proportion of
blacks in the officer corps has been rising steadily (in the
direction of "representation"), and it is expected to continue
increasing, however slowly. Conversely, the direction of change
for enlisted blacks has usually been increased disparity from the
population standard, with no dramatic reversal of direction ex-
pected in the near future. The Army also observed in its 1978
report on equal opportunity programs that affirmative action
efforts designed to increase the number of minority officers are
only beginning to pay dividends. The recruitment of qualified
minorities has been . difficult , states the Army, due largely to
intense civilian competition for minority college graduates and
recruiting efforts by competing universities for minorities
79
otherwise qualified to enroll in precommission programs.
In addition, blacks in both the officer corps and the enlisted
force are concentrated in the lower ranks. This is partly due to
the fact that promotion is time-dependent, and recent years have
seen relatively large increases in the proportion of officers and
enlisted personnel who are black. It is partly due also to the
lingering remains of racial inequities.
The Services have sought to eliminate the institutional
discrimination that exists in most facets of career advancement
and promotion opportunities. As Segal and Nordlie observe, trend
data do suggest that the Army, for example, has made "great strides
in reducing inequalities in promotion rates, at most enlisted
ranks, and in most specialties." And, even though statistics
"indicate the persistence of differentials in time to make grade
'^Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity; Second Annual
Assessment of Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Personnel, February 1978), pp. iii-iv.
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at all enlisted ranks in 1975, these differentials have been
diminishing except at the most senior NCO levels. "73
Promotion rates tend to vary for different jobs or career
fields. Certain military specialties offer faster and more regular
promotions. Some occupational classifications for officers do
not offer command opportunities or the same career progression
possibilities available in other assignments. Because blacks
perform relatively poorly on the military's "paper and pencil
tests"— and because the mental aptitude testing system is used to
match individuals with jobs--blacks have disproportionately served,
historically, in the so-called "soft," non-technical skills for
which training is minimal and advancement is often slow. 4
Since the Vietnam War casualty controversy first erupted in
the mid-1960s, the Armed Forces have kept close watch over the
proportion of blacks in major occupational groups and they have
attempted to manage affirmative action goals for a more "represen-
tative" distribution. Most efforts have concentrated on reducing
the number of blacks who serve in the combat arms specialties—that
is, those military jobs which are more likely to "bear the burden"
of casualties in wartime. The Army, as seen in Table 6, has been
successful in reducing the relative proportion of blacks assigned
to infantry and gun crews. At the close of Fiscal 1983, about 30
percent of enlisted men in the Army were black, while blacks
accounted for 29 percent of all enlisted men assigned to combat
arms occupations. In all Services combined, the proportion of
blacks assigned to combat arms (25 percent) still exceeded the
7-^Segal and Mordlie, "Racial Inequality," p. 10.
'^In addition to mental testing, other institutional policies
and procedures in recruiting, training, and upgrading personnel
influence the placement and "utilization" of the military's minor-
ity population. An analysis of this problem in the Navy and
Marine Corps— and related issues involved in the implementation of
effective affirmative action and equal opportunity programs— can
be found in Herbert R. Northrup et al., Black and Other Minority
Participation in the All-Volunteer Navy and Marine Corps (Phila-
delphia: The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, 1979).
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overall proportion of enlisted men who were black (21 percent) ty
a slight margin, due principally to the occupational distributions
in the Navy and the Marine Corps.
The overrepresentation of blacks in combat arms is a rela-
tively recent phenomenon. Questions regarding the presumed loyalty
of blacks and their combat abilities, as well as the needs and
operational requirements of segregation, have functioned to bar
blacks from the battlefields of this nation's wars. Throughout
World War I, blacks were viewed as second-class soldiers and
assigned almost exclusively to the Service of the Supplies. By
the end of the next World War, blacks still made up fewer than 3
percent of all soldiers assigned to combat arms. ^ After a long
history of recruitment quotas and exclusionary assignment prac-
tices, the Armed Forces gradually removed their racial barriers
and allowed blacks the "right to fight" in two Asian wars.
The overrepresentation of blacks in the service and support
specialties is a trend that can be traced back as far as the
American Revolution. ° In 1964, the last peacetime year before
the war in Vietnam, blacks were greatly overrepresented in the
Service and Supply Handler occupational area in all four Services
(especially in the Air Force and the Navy) . In every succeeding
year to present, blacks have remained overrepresented in this
occupational area in all four Services. At the same time, black
enlisted personnel tend to be concentrated in the Functional
Support and Administration categories (see Table 6).
A closer examination of the twenty most common occupational
subgroups in the Army provides an even more revealing picture of
recent trends in black participation. As of September 1983, over
half of all Army enlisted men assigned to the Supply and
' H. S. Milton, ed., The Utilzation of Negro Manpower in the
Army , Report ORC-R-11 (Chevy Chase, Md.: Operations Research
Office, The Johns Hopkins University, 1955), p. 562.
'"See, for example, Benjamin Quarles, The Negro in the Amer-




Blacks as a Percentage of Male Enlisted Personnel
Assigned to Major Occupational Areas, by Service,
September 1983
Occupational Marine Air All
Areas Army Navy Corps Force Services
Infantry, Gun Crews,
and Seamanship
Specialists 28.5 14.4 21.6 15.8 24.7
Electronic Equip-
ment Repairers 24.1 6.0 8.7 7.4 10.2
Communicat ions
and Intelligence
Specialists 28.7 13.0 20.5 16.7 21.3
Medical and Dental
Specialists 32;3 16.1 a 19.6 24.1
Other Technical and
Allied Specialists 25.3 7.1 18.7 13.9 18.1
Functional Support







Blacks as a percent
of all male enlisted
personnel 30.3 12.3 20.3 16.4 20.7
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
aThe Navy provides the Marine Corps with medical support.
"Non-Occupational" area includes patients, prisoners, officer candidates
and students, persons serving in undesignated or special occupations, and
persons who are not yet occupationally qualified (service members who are
in basic or occupational training).
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27.7 10.3 16.2 13.5 16.3
26.7 6.8 21.9 17.5 15.6
32.6 16.8 28.1 23.5 27.0
20.6 16.2 15.8 12.4 16.5
Administration (54 percent) and Wire Communications (53 percent)
occupational subgroups were black. Although blacks were almost
perfectly "represented" in the Infantry, over 42 percent of all men
assigned to Artillery and Gunnery skills (the second most common
occupational subgroup) were black. In addition, blacks accounted
for over 40 percent of Army enlisted personnel in several other
"soft skills": Unit Supply (47 percent), Food Service (45
percent) , Administration (40 percent) , and Personnel (45 percent) .
In contrast, less than 14 percent of the Law Enforcement (military
police) subgroup was black in Fiscal 1983, and blacks were notice-
ably underrepresented in Armor and Amphibious (24 percent) , Combat
Operations Control (23 percent) , Combat Engineering (23 percent) ,
Track Vehicle Repair (18 percent) , and Aircraft (15 percent) .
When the Army's occupational subgroups are again subdivided
into primary military occupational specialties, even wider dis-
crepancies are observed. For example, under the Artillery and
Gunnery subgroup, blacks comprised 47 percent of all enlisted
males in the Cannon Crewman specialty—and between 36 percent and
25 percent of other occupational assignments. In several special-
ties under the Personnel subgroup, the proportion of blacks
exceeded 50 percent. Under Supply Administration, percentages
ranged from a high of 61 (Equipment Records and Parts) to a low
of 26 (Senior Supply Sergeant). In other subgroups, too, the
proportion of blacks within certain occupational specialties was
more than double the "expected" rate (or overall proportion of
7 7blacks in the enlisted force) . '
'
It is interesting to observe that black officers are "over-
represented" in the same major occupational areas as are black
enlistees: Supply and Procurement, Administration, and Engineering
and Maintenance. Black officers tend to be "underrepresented" in
' 'Percentage distributions were derived from data provided
by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
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the General Officer and Executive categories. Tactical Operations,
Intelligence, and the Medical fields. 78
One immediate consequence of an assignment process that
places disproportionate numbers of blacks in certain occupational
groups and subgroups—along with relatively higher black reenlist-
ment rates--is the creation of disproportionately black units.
Table 7 shows the proportion of black enlisted personnel in
selected combat divisions and battalions within the Army and the
Marine Corps at the close of Fiscal 1980. (The divisions presented
in Table 7 were selected primarily on the basis of their location.)
Among all Army divisions located in the United States, the 4th
Infantry, stationed at Fort Carson, Colorado (26 percent), and
the 82nd Airborne at Fort Bragg, North Carolina (27 percent) had
the lowest proportions of blacks. The 5th Infantry Division at
Fort Polk, Louisiana and the 24th Infantry Division at Fort
Stewart, Georgia (neither of which is shown in Table 7) had the
highest proportions of blacks (41 percent). Within the Army's
divisions presented here, the proportions of blacks were generally
highest in signal battalions— followed by transportation, artil-
lery, and medical battalions (not shown). In the Marine Corps,
blacks were concentrated most heavily in infantry and combat-
oriented battalions. Army data also show that the 197th Infantry
Brigade at Fort Benning had the highest percentage of blacks in
1980 (52 percent of enlisted personnel)—with blacks representing
almost 60 percent of all enlisted personnel in one artillery
battalion (and over 66 percent of a battery within this battalion) .
7 ft
°At the beginning of this decade, blacks comprised 7.6
percent of officers assigned to Supply, Procurement and Allied
Specialties; 7.2 percent of those assigned to Administration; and
5.3 percent of those assigned to Engineering and Maintenance. On
the other hand, blacks comprised 1.5 percent of General Officers
and Executives; just over 3 percent of Tactical Operations and
Intelligence Officers; arid 4.8 percent of Medical Officers.
(About 5 percent of all officers were black.)
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TABLE 7
Blacks as a Percentage of Enlisted Personnel Assigned to
Selected Divisions and Component Battalions in the














Army (Total Black Enlisted
Personnel = 32.9 Percent)
82nd Airborne Division Ft. Bragg, NC 26.0 38.0 Signal
101st Airborne Division Ft. Canpbell, KY 33.8 49.2 Signal
3rd Armored Division Europe 34.2 49.4 Signal
2nd Infantry Division Korea 41.2 57.6 Signal
1st Cavalry Division Ft. Hood, TX 38.2 54.4 Transp.
16.4 Infantry









Canp Pendleton, CA 25.4
Camp Lejeune, NC 33.0
Okinawa 29.6
30.1 Infantry 14.0 Assault
38.2 Infantry 12.8 Assault
35.2 Artillery 23.1 Track Veh.




Measurements of military effectiveness are at best imprecise
and subject to considerable debate. As Sam Sarkesian. observes in
Combat Effectiveness , the only "sure measure," after all, is
actual performance. But, "we cannot wait for wars" to evaluate
the nation's military preparedness: "Some measure of effective-
ness, imperfect as it may be, is necessary. A realistic measure
of combat effectiveness, therefore, must include a mix of objective
and subjective measures, but perhaps more importantly, it must
7 Q
accept intuitive assessments and allow for imponderables." y
Effectiveness is directly related to population representation
only insofar as such representation provides the strongest and most
capable force. This understanding is perhaps best illustrated by
the example of perfect population representation. Perfect repre-
sentation, by definition, implies that the worst as well as the
best elements of society be present in the ranks of the military.
In practice, this would mean that restrictive standards on mental
aptitude, moral background, and physical condition (and any other
standards, such as age and gender-related prohibitions) be com-
pletely removed to allow everyone an equal right to participate.
It would mean that the Armed Forces actively seek and recruit not
the most "qualified," but the most "representative" members of
society, however defined. The ultimate objective would be a
military that mirrored the general population, and any organiza-
tional needs would have to conform to this objective (or at least
be assigned a lower priority)
.
Most discussions of the relationship between representation
and military needs concentrate on measures of "quality"--or "those
aspects and attributes of military personnel that are deemed
desirable and that contribute to a more productive, capable, and
7 Q
'^Sam C. Sarkesian, "Combat Effectiveness," in Combat Effec-
tiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military , Sam C.




better motivated force." 80 The most common definition of "quality"
is that used in Defense Manpower Quality Requirements , a compre-
hensive report prepared for the Senate Armed Services Committee
during the first year of the all-volunteer military. As the
report notes in its introductory remarks, "the combat effectiveness
of the Armed Forces depends, to a great extent, on the competence,
discipline and motivation of its members. For this reason, a
quality force is a priority objective." 81 The report goes on to
define the basic elements of quality measurement, including: (1)
Physical Condition (determined by medical examination) ; (2) Moral
Background (determined by enlistee statements and/or police record
checks on arrests and convictions); (3) Trainability (determined
by aptitude tests); and (4) Motivation/Discipline (determined by
high school completion and applicant interviews). 82
The problem is that there is no convenient, comprehensive, or
absolute measure of personnel quality. Adjectives such as "desi-
rable," "capable," "motivated," "productive," "suitable," "useful,"
"competent," "disciplined," and "adaptable" are all used to
describe the perfect military recruit. Because of the difficulty
in constructing individual profiles and predictors of performance,
military quality objectives are typically expressed in practical
terms according to the individual's educational attainment and
aptitude test scores. The Department of Defense, in fact, cur-
rently uses AFQT percentile scores (reported in the traditional
ouCooper, Military Manpower , p. 128.
81Department of Defense, Defense Manpower Quality Require-
ments , Report to the Senate Armed Services Committee (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower and
Reserve Affairs], January 1974), p. i.
82 Ibid., pp. 1-8.
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"categories") and high school completion to gauge the quality - of
new recruits and set annual manpower requirements. J
Education and aptitude have been shown in several studies to
correlate well with performance on the job, trainability for
occupational assignment, and adaptability to military life. *
Non-high school graduates, for example, characteristically
experience more disciplinary, administrative, and retraining
actions than do those who complete high school, resulting in a
much larger rate of early discharge. 5 Courts-martial and
non-judicial punishments occurred among non-high school graduates
at rates 1.5 to 3 times more often than among graduates during
the late 1960s. And, high school dropouts were found 15 to 20
percent less productive on the job (according to supervisor rat-
ings) than were high school graduates in another, more recent
study. 86
Defense manpower officials report that "a high school graduate
has almost an 80 percent probability of completing the first
three years of military service as against a 60 percent probability
for the non-graduate." Although aptitude tests are "not perfect
predictors," it is observed, "they do enhance the probability
°^AFQT categories are explained briefly in footnote 71 above.
A more recent treatment of manpower "quality" and Service
recruiting objectives may be found in Department of Defense,
Defense Manpower Quality , Volumes I-III , Report to the House and
Senate Committees on Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: Office of
the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Installations, and
Logistics], May 1985).
84 See, for example, Department of the Army, Quality Soldier
Study (Ft. Monroe, Va . : Department of the Army, Training and
Doctrine Command [TRADOC] Volunteer Division, 14 May 1975); see
also General Accounting Office, Problems Resulting From Management
Practices in Recruiting, Training, and Using Non-High School
Graduates and Mental Category IV Personnel , FPCD-76-24 (Washington,
D.C.: General Accounting Office, 12 January 1976).
OJDepartment of Defense, Quality Requirements , p. 5; see
also General Accounting Office, Problems .
p c
°°Cooper, Military Manpower , pp. 129-130.
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that the Services will select the best people from the pool of
applicants and will assign them to jobs in which they are likely
07
to succeed." 07 The Department of Defense "compensates" for the
higher loss rates among high school dropouts by requiring that
they have higher aptitude test scores to qualify for enlistment.
An applicant who is found unfit (under basic operational
standards) for military service can still receive an "enlistment
waiver" in certain circumstances and be admitted to active duty.
(The categories for enlistment waivers include moral standards,
aptitude test scores, physical qualifications, age, dependents,
education, alien status, and so on.) During 1980, approximately
13 percent of black recruits, compared with 21 percent of white
recruits, required some form of enlistment waiver. About eight
out of ten waivers (seven out of ten for black recruits) v/ere
granted for primary applicant rejection due to moral unsuitability
.
Table 8 displays the percentages of recruits, by race and
Service, who required particular types of moral waivers during
Fiscal 1983. It should be noted here that the differences in
moral waiver rates between the Services, especially in the Navy
and Marine Corps, reflect different reporting procedures and, in
some cases, entry requirements. For example, based on the state-
ments of applicants, the Navy may require a lower-level adminis-
trative waiver under the category of "drug abuse." The Navy
reported these lower-level drug abuse waivers; other Services,
because of changes in Department of Defense reporting requirements,
did not. The Marine Corps, unlike the other Services, required
(and reported) enlistment waivers for minor traffic offenses—with
over 42 percent of its white recruits and 26 percent of its black
recruits receiving special administrative clearances under this
category. Nevertheless, it is apparent from an examination of
Table 8 that, in instances where there are differences betv/een
white and black recruits, proportionately more white recruits
required moral waivers of all types in all Services. In the Army
8
'Department of Defense, Aptitude Testing , p. 1
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TABLE 8
Percent of New Recruits Who Received Moral Waivers












White Black White Black Total
Minor Traffic





0.9 0.3 3.4 2.0 5.4" 3.2 0.1 b 1.9 0.9 1.7
More Than 3
Minor Offenses
(Non-Traffic) 0.4 0.2 0.4 0.2 0.5 0.1 b 0.0 0.3 0.1 0.3
Other (Non-Minor
Misdemeanor) 6.7 3.1 14.2 7.5 5.8 2.5 1.0 0.4 7.3 3.4 6.6
Adult Felony b b 0.1 0.1 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Juvenile Felony b b 0.2 0.1 1.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.1 0.2
Drug Abuse b b 9.8 7.7 5.4 4.1 b 0.0 3.1 1.9 2.9
Alcohol Abuse b b 0.4 b 0.4 0.1 .0.0 0.0 0.1 b 0.1
TOTAL 8.4 3.8 29.1 17.8 61.3 36.5 1.4 0.5 18.5 9.6 16.9
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
aInter-Service comparisons should be avoided since differences could reflect different report
ing procedures, administrative processes for enlistment, and, in some cases, entry requirements
of the individual Services.
^ess than 0.05 percent.
Percentages for types of moral waivers may not add up to column totals as a result of
rounding.
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and the Marine Corps the proportion of whites who entered with
moral waivers is substantially higher than the comparable propor-
tion of blacks.
There are at least two possible interpretations of the data
on moral waivers presented in Table 8. One might conclude that
blacks who applied for enlistment in 1983 were "better" prospects
than their white peers in terms of the military's moral standards.
On the other hand, the data may reflect the fact that recruiters
and Service officials made a greater effort to get white recruits,
possibly at the expense of equal treatment for those blacks who
were similarly qualified (or unqualified)
.
High standards usually indicate that the Services are able to
select from among a plentiful supply of available applicants
(that is, the military can afford to be "choosy"). Recruiting
success thus operates in conjunction with more restrictive enlist-
ment standards. These particular data on enlistment waivers,
then, seem to imply that the Armed Forces are digging down somewhat
deeper into the supply of otherwise less desirable white applicants
than black applicants to meet their recruiting requirements.
All enlistees must also pass through other "gates" or screen-
ing devices after they enter military service, because "predictors
are, inevitably, not perfect." 88 For example, new enlistees have
to pass recruit training and skill training courses before being
assigned to a unit. As members of units, they must reach certain
levels of performance and commonly pass written or "hands-on"
performance tests before consideration for promotion. Screening
procedures are likewise used to limit reenlistment eligibility. ^
The Department of Defense and the Military Services strive
to enlist as many high school graduates and as many high test-
scorers as possible—although there is some evidence that more
may not always be better . The Defense Manpower Commission, for




areas, some Category IV personnel perform as well or better than
a number of Category I-III personnel." 90 Indeed, in a study of
tank crew members by the Army Training and Doctrine Command
(TRADOC) it was found that the best educated and most intelligent
Q "I
students were the worst gunners.
In the early days of all-volunteer recruiting, Secretary of
Defense Elliot Richardson stated that, in fact, there is an optimal
level of low-ability personnel needed in the Armed Forces:
Overall, the learning capacity of new
entries is adequate in meeting job requirements
when the proportion of Mental Group IV person-
nel does not exceed about 22 percent. Con-
versely, when the overall proportion of Mental
Group IV personnel falls below 15 percent,
there is a tendency toward many people being
under-challenged by their job assignments.
"An extremely capable individual in an unchallenging and
unsophisticated job," adds a Department of Defense report on
quality requirements, "can create morale and motivational problems.
Individuals should be matched as closely as possible to skill
requirements in order to serve the best interests of both the
individual and the Service." 9 -^ Although all jobs "require moti-
vation, maturity, and ability to adjust to a military way of
life," there are "a number of jobs in the Service which permit a
lower aptitude than others." 9 It is therefore possible, Defense
Secretary Melvin Laird once observed, that "an organization
composed of bright people unchallenged by their jobs would be as
90Defense Manpower Commission, Defense Manpower , p. 158.
9
-'-See Coffey et al., "The Impact of Socio-Economic Compo-
sition," pp. 49-50.
92 Elliot L. Richardson, The All-Volunteer Force and the End
of the Draft , Special Report of the Secretary of Defense (Washing-
ton, D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, March 1973), p. 13.
^-Department of Defense, Quality Requirements , p. 15.
94 Ibid., p. 14.
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much of a quality mismatch as an organization made up of people
who lack the ability to perform their jobs. . . . " 95 The funda-
mental goal, according to Laird, "should be to obtain people who
can perform the required job in a completely adequate fashion." 96
There are increased costs associated with "both the acceptance
of too many personnel who measure low on the enlistment standards
and with demanding too many personnel who measure high," another
Department of Defense report to Congress points out. 9 ''7 This
"cost-effective" line of reasoning still serves as the accepted
approach for determining manpower quality requirements. In recent
years, research has taken the approach a few steps closer to
finding a so-termed "optimal quality mix"--where recruiting,
training, and force maintenance costs can be balanced against dif-
fering levels of personnel quality and performance.
Studies of the military's racial content—following a prece-
dent set with the first serious examination of racial integration
— frequently focus on the differences in "quality" between white
and black service members. Historically, blacks have not performed
as well as whites on the military's standardized tests. Table 9,
for instance, shows the distribution of white and non-white male
enlisted entrants by AFQT category over the past three decades
(since the end of the Korean War) . These historical data reveal
that only about 8 to 12 percent of non-white male recruits have
usually placed in the "above-average" categories (I and II),
compared with approximately 40 percent of white males. In fact,
Q C
:7JMelvm R. Laird, Progress in Ending the Draft and Achieving
the All-Volunteer Force: Report to the President (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Secretary of Defense, July 1972), p. 23.
96 Ibid., p. 27.
Q7^
'Department of Defense, Implementation of New Armed Services
Vocational Aptitude Battery and Actions to Improve the Enlistment
Standards Process , A Report to the House and Senate Committees on
Armed Services (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and Logistics], 31
December 1980), p. 3. See also Department of Defense, America '
s
Volunteers , p. 25.
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TABLE 9
Percentage Distribution of Male Recruits (All Services)
by Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT) Category
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Source: AFQT category distributions for 1951 through 1973 were derived from data found in
Bernard D. Karpinos, Male Chargeable Accessions: Evaluation by Mental Categories (1953-1973),
SR-ED-75-1 8 (Alexandria, VA:_ Human Resources Research Organization, January I977X ATI
other distributions were derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
percentage distributions for 1953 through 1973 include male enlisted accessions (enlistees and
inductees) without prior service who entered the military between January and December of the
respective year or years. Percentage distributions for subsequent years cover the fiscal year.
Draftees who failed the aptitude tests but who were declared administratively acceptable (on the
basis of personal interviews and some additional aptitude testing) are included in AFQT Category
IV. Renormed test scores are used for the 1976-80 period.
All applicants for enlistment are tested for their mental aptitude. Test scores are used to
classify applicants into one of five so^termed AFQT categories (Category I through V). Those in
Categories I and II are above average in aptitude; those in Category III are average; those in
Category IV are below average, but still eligible for enlistment; and those in Category V (not
shown) are at the very bottom of the scale and not eligible to enter military service.
c1964 was the last peacetime year before the war in Vietnam.
<
^The greatest influx of new recruits during any one-year period since World War II occurred in
1966.
e1973 was the first year of the All-Volunteer Force. (The last draft call was issued by the
Selective Service System in December 1972.)
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the average (median) AFQT score for non-white males (ranging
between the 25th and 35th percentile) is about 25 percentile
points below the average AFQT score for white males (ranging
between the 45th and 55th percentile) in the period since the end
of the Korean War.
"Up to the beginning of this century," Leona Tyler observes,
"there was scarcely a dissenting voice in the general consensus
among persons of European descent that definite mental differences
in the various races paralleled their obvious physical differences,
and that the white race was unquestionably superior to all the
others."^ Differences between the tested abilities of white and
black' Americans are still the subject of considerable controversy
in academic, social, and political circles. The classic "nature-
nurture" argument over the relative influence of heredity and
environment on measured "intelligence" has stood at the center of
the controversy for over one-hundred years. 00
Q O
Leona E. Tyler, The Psychology of Human Differences , 3rd
Ed. (Mew York: Appleton-Century-Crof ts , Inc., 1965), p. 299. A
compendium of research on race differences can be found in Audrey
M. Shuey, The Testing of Negro Intelligence , 2nd Ed. (New York:
Social Science Press, 1966).
Q Q
^See, among others, N. J. Block and Gerald Dworkin, eds.,
The 10 Controversy: Critical Readings (New York: Pantheon Books,
1976); Douglas Lee Eckberg, Intelligence and Race (New York:
Praeger Publishers, 1979); Paul P.. Ehrlich and Shirley S. Feldman,
The Race Bomb: Skin Color, Prejudice, and Intelligence (New York:
Quadrangle/The New York Times Book Co., 1977); Sandra Scarr, Race,
Social Class, and Individual Differences in 10 (Hillsdale, N.J.:
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc., 1981); John C. Loehlin et al.,
Race Differences in Intelligence (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman
and Company, 1975); Leon J. Kamin, The Science and Politics of 10
(Potomac, Md.: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1974); Ashley Montagu,
ed., Race and 10 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975); James
R. Flynn, Race, 10 and Jensen (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1980); and H. J. Eysenck, The 10 Argument: Race, Intelligence and
Education (New York: The Library Press, 1971).
1 Early examples (beginning in 1869) of the nature-nurture
debate can be found in James J. Jenkins and Donald G. Paterson,
Studies in Individual Differences: The Search for Intelligence
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts , Inc., 1961). Also, Arthur R.
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The subject of race differences in performance on mental
tests has consequently become a highly divisive issue, more often
a source of heat than of light, among psychologists and other
scientists. The heat of the debate is fueled by the uncontested
result that "standardized intelligence tests of practically every
description show an average white-black difference of very close
to one standard deviation, with over 90 percent of the published
studies reporting differences between 2/3 and 1-1/3 standard
deviation, which on the IQ scale (with a standard deviation equal
to 15) is between 10 and 20 IQ points, with a mean of 15 points
difference." 101
The sharp contrast in the average test scores of whites and
blacks has been used to justify segregation, racial restrictions,
and quotas in the military. Historically, the military's aptitude
tests have also served as a convenient device to regulate the
enlistment of blacks. The predictability of differences between
the races on certain test items and subtests permits the creation
of test composites which, with a fair degree of confidence, can
Jensen, Genetics and Education (New York: Harper and Row, 1972);
Arthur R. Jensen, Educability and Group Differences (New York:
Harper and Row, 1973); Robert Cancro, ed., Intelligence: Genetic
and Environmental Influences (New York: Crune and Stratton, 1971);
Environment, Heredity, and Intelligence , Reprint Series No. 2.
(Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard Educational Review, 1969); James M.
Lawler, 10, Heritability and Racism (New York: International
Publishers, 1978). In a balanced treatment of the "nature" and
"nurture" positions, Phillip E. Vernon concludes that "both genetic
and environmental factors are always involved, and their relative
variance cannot, as yet, be quantified." There is no clear verdict
in either direction, he adds. (See Intelligence: Heredity and
Envi ronment
, [San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1979],
p. 332.)
101Arthur R. Jensen, Bias in Mental Testing (Mew York: The
Free Press, 1980), p. 98. Although testing research supports the
"uncontested result" of race differences, standardized tests and
testing situations are widely criticized. Criticisms focus on
cultural bias, specific test items, measurement of "intelligence,"
the failure of tests to measure certain capacities, the use of
unsuitable norms, the contamination of test scores by extraneous
factors, and other elements.
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be used to "favor" one group over another. (Until recently, the
Army actually used a different test composite for male and female
applicants in determining AFQT scores. The net effect of this
practice was a relative reduction in the supply of qualified
female applicants— even though it appeared that males and females
were being evaluated equally in terms of aptitude standards.) In
a less subtle manner, a virtual control over racial composition
can be achieved by establishing high test scores as the primary
requirement for initial entry and reenlistment (especially under
conscription and periods of extensive manpower resources).
In 1950, the Army agreed to abolish its racial quota because
it believed that (1) blacks could be "counted on" to score well
below whites on mental qualifying examinations and, therefore,
(2) the minimum mental aptitude standards could be manipulated,
if necessary, to keep the proportion of black enlistments below
ID?10 percent. uz- In 1975 and again in 1979, the Navy was accused
by a Congressman of using a disguised racial quota in the form of
restrictions on the percentage of recruits who placed in the
lowest acceptable category (AFQT Category IV). 103 In 1980,
Congress itself imposed a ceiling on the percentage of AFQT
102 The Fahy Committee urged the Army to substitute an achieve-
ment quota for its racial quota— not ing the great difference
between black and white soldiers in education and performance on
mental aptitude tests. The Army, it was pointed out, could adjust
its General Classification Test (GCT) minimum qualification scores
up or down and use its physical, psychiatric, and moral standards
to effectively regulate the number of black enlistments and reen-
listments. See Memorandum to the President from David K. Niles,
7 February 1950, and supporting documents in Morris J. MacGregor,
Jr. and Bernard C. Nalty, Blacks in United States Armed Forces;
Basic Documents, Volume XI: Fahy Committee (Wilmington, De.:
Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1977), pp. 1343-1345; and Letter to




^George C. Wilson, "Bias in Recruiting Laid to 4 Services,"
Washington Post , 8 June 1976, p. A-18; Coffey and Reeg, "Repre-
sentational Policy," pp. 16-18; George C. Wilson, "Navy is Accused
of Bias in Entrance Standards," Washington Post , 14 June 1979, p.
A-3.
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Category IV recruits who were permitted to enter military ser-
vice. ^ Tests are among the oldest and most effective tools of
institutional racial discrimination. And, though limitations on
AFQT Category IV recruits may act to raise the overall "quality"
of the military, they additionally set upright, according to some
observers, a traditional barrier to blacks. luJ The law was
obviously not intended to accomplish this purpose; nonetheless,
racial partiality exists.
Although black recruits do not perform as well as their
white counterparts on the military's aptitude tests, they do
surpass whites in formal education. Since 1976, a greater percen-
tage of black recruits than of white recruits in all four Services
have entered active duty with at least a high school diploma (see
Table 10). This trend takes on added meaning when one considers
that the high school completion rate for young blacks still trails
the rate for whites nationwide by a considerable margin. 10 "
104 The standards were first imposed by Congress in the Fiscal
1981 Defense Authorization Act. The standards required, that all
Services (combined) enlist no more than 25 percent of new recruits
during 1981 in AFQT Category IV. In 1982, each Service (separ-
ately) was allowed to have no more than 25 percent of its new
recruits in AFQT Category IV. And in 1983 and beyond, each Service
could have no more than 20 percent of its new recruits in the
lowest category. See Public Law (P.L.) 96-342; P.L. 97-86; P.L.
97-252; and P.L. 98-94.
105 See Tom Philpott, "Cat IV Rules Pose Earrier to Blacks,"
Army Times , 29 September 1980, p. 1. Actually, testing devices
and "mental" requirements are old-fashioned tools of discrim-
ination. Literacy tests designed to restrict voting rights and
the so-called intelligence tests used to limit American immigra-
tion (introduced in 1917) are two of the more glaring examples.
There are numerous other examples of "unfair" tests for admission
to American institutions; and the modern movement to remove cul-
tural bias from some of these testing devices is a reaction to
this understanding.
l0
°See, for example, Center for Education Statistics, Condi-
tion of Education: 1979 Edition , pp. 184-185; and Department of
Defense, Profile of American Youth , p. 26.
66
TABLE 10
Percentage of New Recruits With a High School Diploma,
by Race and Service, 1972-833
Fiscal
Year
Arm)r Navy Marine Corps
White Black
Air Force All Services
White Black White Black White Black White Elack
1972 61.0 63.6 77.8 69.2 46.9 47.0 85.0 80.6 68.1 65.1
1973 62.8 58.7 71.3 66.5 44.0 46.4 84.7 85.8 67.6 63.0
1974 49.3 49.5 68.8 66.8 46.5 45.7 84.9 90.1 61.2 57.3
1975 56.4 60.3 73.4 71.6 54.4 48.2 85.9 90.7 66.3 64.7
1976 55.6 63.6 74.6 80.3 57.8 63.2 88.8 92.0 67.3 68.7
1977 57.2 66.6 72.9 77.5 69.2 75.2 92.0 95.6 70.5 72.2
1978 69.9 78.9 70.8 80.1 68.1 76.4 84.8 91.9 73.6 80.^
1979 60.8 70.6 71.7 84.7 69.6 79.7 82.6 91.0 70.4 76.6
1980 49.4 66.6 72.8 87.2 74.2 85.4 83.2 91.3 66.2 75.2
1981 76.3 90.6 73.7 86.8 77.6 87.3 88.6 94.4 78.8 90.2
1982 87.0 93.6 76.8 87.4 83.2 91.2 94.3 97.4 84.4 92.9
1983 85.5 94.5 90.1 96.2 90.7 95.4 98.4 99.0 90.0 95.6
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
aRecruits with a high school diploma include persons who attended or graduated
from college. Individuals who passed the General Educational Development (GED)
high school equivalency examination are not included.
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Black enlistees, then, tend to raise the overall educational
"quality" level of the enlisted force. This is most apparent in
the Army and in the Navy, where the proportion of black recruits
with a high school diploma has exceeded the comparable proportion
of white recruits over the past several years by as much as 15
percentage points. Indeed, in the Army, less than half of all
white recruits in 1 980--compar ed with 63 percent of black
recruits—had completed high school. At the close of Fiscal 1983
the "quality" gap had narrowed somewhat, but the relative propor-
tion of black high school graduates (95 percent) remained notice-
ably higher than the proportion of white graduates (86 percent)
.
There are no generalizations or simple conclusions here for
those who wish to equate the two shorthand measures of "quality,"
educational level and aptitude test scores, with racial issues or
the requirements for racial representation. Manpower managers
place more importance on education than on test scores as a pre-
dictor of an individual's overall performance or "staying power."
High school graduation, as noted, is a proven measure—the "best
single measure"— of the individual's potential to adapt to military
l n 7life. w/ Enlistees who perform relatively poorly on aptitude
tests, on the other hand, can often be "matched" with less demand-
ing military jobs in which they perform adequately. 08
Attrition is considered among the most problematic aspects
of the all-volunteer military, since (1) attrition rose markedly
in the mid-1970s, (2) past efforts have often failed to deal
sufficiently with the problem, and (3) attrition means that more
accessions are needed to sustain force size (with greatly increased
107Department of Defense, Interim Report of the Study of the
All-Volunteer Force (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics],




] noxuo See I. M. Greenberg, Mental Standards for Enlistment:
Performance of Army Personnel Related to AFQT/ASVAB Scores ,





Table 11 displays the first-term attrition rates of new
recruits v/ho entered the military from 1973 through 1978, arranged
by race, sex, Service, and high school graduation status. In
both education categories (high school graduate and nongraduate)
,
it can be seen that black female enlistees have experienced mark-
edly lower attrition rates than their white counterparts. Black
male enlistees in all Services except the Army have higher attri-
tion rates than those of whites. Overall, the attrition rate for
white males (32.5 percent) is approximately equal to the rate for
black males (33.6 percent). The historical attrition rate for
black females is 29 percent, compared with about 39 percent for
white females.
It should be recalled that the continuing trend of the past
several years has been the enlistment of proportionately more
blacks than whites who have attained a high school diploma. At
. the same time, the difference between the attrition rates of
white and black high school graduates has narrowed considerably
over the past decade. In effect, the overall proportion of white
male enlistees v/ho experience attrition is slightly higher now
than the overall proportion of black male enlistees who separate
before completing their first term. And this latest trend coin-
cides with the increase in the educational "quality" of black
recruits
.
More recent data suggest that a smaller proportion of blacks
than whites who are released from military service each year do so
with an "honorable" discharge—but the differences between members
of the two races are generally small. Table 12, for example,
shows that the distributions of black and white enlisted personnel
who were discharged from the Armed Forces during Fiscal 1983 are
reasonably similar in respect to character of service, with certain
exceptions in the Navy and Air Force.
A more revealing indicator of performance can be obtained
through analysis of separation rates (that is, the percentage of
personnel, based on end-strengths, v/ho are discharged from active
duty) by cause of separation. Separation rates computed for
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TABLE 11
First-Term Attrition Rates For New Recruits
Who Entered the Military From 1973 through 1978, by Sex,
High School Graduation Status, Race, and Service3
Sex, High School
Graduation Status,























































































Source: Derived from data appearing in E . S. Flyer & R. S. Elster, First Term
Attrition Among, Non-Prior Service Enlisted Personnel: Loss
Probabilities Based on Selected Entry Factors , NPS-54-83-007
(Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, June 1983), pp. 22-23.
Attrition rate is the percent of personnel who were discharged from the
military before completing either three years of service or their first
scheduled term of enlistment.
White category includes persons from all racial groups other than black.
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TABLE 12
Percentage Distribution of Enlisted Personnel
Discharged From the Armed Forces, by Character
of Service, Race, and Component, Fiscal 1983a
Character Army Navy Marine Corps Air Force All Services
of
Service White Black White Black White Black White Black White Black
Honorable 78.0 78.8 68.2 62.8 71.4 67.7 76.8 68.3 74.4 74.0
General 11.1 12.5 9.2 12.6 4.6 6.3 14.8 24.2 10.5 13.0
Other than
Honorable 4.7 4.5 11.8 13.2 15.6 17.5 0.8 1.6 7.2 7.1
Bad
Conduct 0.3 0.4 4.6 4.4 2.7 3.8 0.7 1.3 1.8 1.5
Dishonorable b b b 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.3 b 0.1
Unknown 5.9 3.9 6.2 6.9 5.6 4.6 6.8 4.3 6.1 4.4
Total
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1CO.0 "100.0 100. 100.0 1CO.0
Number 97,277 39,701 60,612 8,419 30,495 8,645 45,171 7,301 233,555 64,066
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
Does not include persons who were "discharged" for the purpose of immediate
reenlistment
.
Less than 0.05 percent.
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Department of Defense enlisted personnel by race and sex are
displayed in Table 13. The results show that black men and women
both experienced lower total separation rates than did their white
peers during Fiscal 1983. Black female enlistees, in fact, typi-
cally had much lower separation rates than did white female enlis-
tees for all possible causes. The separation rates of white male
enlistees exceeded those of black enlistees in all but three
categories (excluding completion of enlistment). The largest
difference between the rates of white and black males occurred in
the category called "convenience of the government" (primarily
early release programs) , v/here the separation rate among whites
was almost double the rate experienced by blacks.
In 1971, the Department of Defense examined the disciplinary
actions affecting men who entered military service between 1966
and 1968 and concluded that "Negroes are having difficulty with
direct authority." 109 A higher percentage of enlisted blacks
than whites were also found to have been tried under court-martial
or received non-judicial punishment in all four Services. 10
In 1980, the Army similarly reported in its Fourth Annual
Assessment of Equal Opportunity Programs (as it did in previous
"assessments") that "black soldiers and, in some instances, ethnic
minority soldiers are indeed in a disproportionate number of
adverse [punitive] act ions--par
t
icularly Article 15s, courts-
martial, and punitive discharges." In the category of "serious
crimes" during Fiscal 1978 and 1979, the Army reported that "the
109Department of Defense, "Analysis of Disciplinary Actions
Affecting First-Term Negro and Caucasian Servicemen," Manpower
Research Note 71-1 (Washington, D.C.: Directorate of Manpower
Research, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower
and Reserve Affairs] , 1971) .
110 Ibid.
-'-^Department of the Army, Equal Opportunity; Fourth Annual
Assessment of Military Programs (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, May 1980), p. 44.
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TABLE 13
Department of Defense Enlisted Separation Rates,
by Cause of Separation, Race, and Gender, Fiscal 1983'
Male Female Total
Cause of Separation White Black White Black White Black
73.3 82.3 73.0 69.6 73.3 80.7
24.0 12.5 68.6 35.7 27.8 15.3
3.4 2.3 4.3 1.9 3.5 2.2
4.1 3.0 3.9 3.0 4.1 3.0
11.6 7.5 25.0 10.3 12.7 7.9
9.6 13.7 8.0 7.8 9.4 12.9
0.9 0.6 3.3 0.7 1.1 0.6
3.4 3.8 1.0 1.1 3.2 3.5
2.7 2.2 1.7 0.6 2.6 2.0
17.0 15.3 5.9 3.3 16.0 13.8
5.9 6.6 2.5 1.9 5.6 6.0
3.6 2.9 0.3 0.3 3.3 2.6
17.0 12.8 2.8 2.1 15.7 11.4
1.0 0.8 0.7 0.4 1.0 0.8


















Rate/1,000 179.7 167.6 204.4 139.8 181.6 164.0
Number 210,832 57,372 22,723 6,694 233,555 64,066
Source: Derived from data provided by the Defense Manpower Data Center.
aSeparation rate is the number of persons discharged per every 1,000 enlistees on
active duty during Fiscal 1983 (based on average end-strength).




black soldier rate was significantly higher than the rate of
founded offenses ... of white soldiers . " ±±z-
Rates for the so-called "founded offenses" (or criminal
offenses that have been substantiated by military police investi-
gation) are displayed in Table 14 by type of crime and race. It
is interesting to observe that the differences between the crime
rates of white and black soldiers remained relatively constant
over the 1978-80 period, followed by a noticeable narrowing of
the gap in 1981 (especially for drug offenses)
.
There are still fairly wide disparities between the various
crime rates for blacks and those for whites. At the same time,
over half of all soldiers in correctional facilities (53.7 percent)
and in confinement (51.2 percent) in the early 1980s were black.
The percentage of blacks in the Army's prisoner population was
about 1.6 times higher than the percentage of blacks in the Army.
(By comparison, the proportion of blacks in the Federal Bureau of
Prisons was 3.7 times greater than the proportion of blacks in
1 1 othe national population
.)
x± °
It has been suggested that the overrepresentation of blacks
in the Army's prison system is indirectly related to other dispar-
ities in black representation. The Southern Christian Leadership
Conference in 1978 laid blame for the high concentration of blacks
in Army penal facilities en inequities in the criminal justice
system--specif ically , the disproportionately low percentage of
black officers (6.1 percent) and the presence of prejudiced white
officers from the South. Officers make the initial decisions
to deal with problems through either minor punishment, court-
martial, or early discharge. Administrative discretion thus
plays an important part in the initial corrective action, and
these decisions have been made mostly by white officers. Moreover,
112 Ibid., p. 47.
113 Ibid., p. 48.
114 Bill Drummond, "Army Concerned About Blacks' High Rates
of Criminality," Washington Post , 19 November 1978, pp. G-l, G-2.
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TABLE 14
Crime Rates of Army Personnel, by Race
















































Source: Data for 1978 and 1979 are from Department of the Army, Equal
Opportunity: Fourth Annual Assessment of Military Programs (Washington,
D.C.: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, May 1980),
p. 47. Data for 1980 and 1981 were provided by the Department of the
Army, Office of Equal Opportunity Programs.
a Includes offenses that have been substantiated by a military police
investigation but not necessarily by a judicial decision.
Rate of offense per every 1,000 soldiers on active duty.
c Includes murder, rape, aggravated assault, and robbery.
Includes burglary, larceny, auto theft, and housebreaking.
e Includes the use, possession, sale, and trafficking of drugs.
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the historical under representation of blacks in the officer corps
has been accompanied by their pronounced scarcity throughout the
entire justice system: in 1978, there was one black (and one
female) among the Army's 46 trial court judges; only four percent
of the Army's lawyers were black; and only 13 percent of the Army's
military police force were black. J
A relatively recent "Study of Racial Factors in the Army's
Justice and Discharge System" found that questions of racial
discrimination could "not be answered definitively." The research-
ers concluded, however, that " both the differential behavior of
persons of different races and the culturally influenced percep-
tions and reactions of those who implement the system contribute
to the result." Although researchers found no evidence to suggest
discrimination per se, they did feel that certain racial differ-
ences in crimes and punishments were a result of the way the
various races "interacted." But, tinkering with the discharge and
justice system, it was also concluded, will not solve the funda-
1 I c
mental problems associated with these racial differences. -LD
Considerations of Unit Performance
There are many theories concerning the~consequences of social
demography on organizational effectiveness, but very little empir-
ical evidence. Furthermore, there are numerous unquantif iable
variables and intangibles, internal and external to the Armed
Forces, that complicate any assessment of the manner or degree in
which the socioeconomic composition of a force affects perform-
117ance. x± '
115 Ibid., p. G-2.
-'--"-"Don Hirst, "Army Justice System. Held Unbiased," Army
Times, 13 April 1982, pp. 1, 14, 18; Don Hirst, "Military Justice
—
Viewpoints Vary," Army Times , 27 April 1981, p. 18.
11
'See Coffey et al., "Socio-Economic Composition."
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The Defense Manpower Commission attempted to determine through
an opinion survey of 154 military commanders in 1975 how (according
to perceptions by the commanders) certain changes in socioeconomic
composition of units may have directly affected the ability of
1 1 o
units to perform, their missions. 10 The Commission found no
evidence in the survey results that socioeconomic composition
affects the capacity of the military to fulfill its mission.
Rather, the Commission concluded, performance is influenced more
by "dynamic factors" such as leadership, training, morale and
discipline, and materiel readiness than by socioeconomic composi-
tion. 119
Even without hard evidence on the requirements for population
representation, questions of effectiveness are raised. And these
questions are often just enough to stimulate public uncertainty
and anxiety about the capability of _ the Armed Forces. For example:
o To what extent does racial imbalance affect the
unity, cohesion, and morale of military units?
That is, does social or racial imbalance
exacerbate internal tensions and provoke
discontent and unrest within the military?
o Does inter-group diversity reduce or improve
field effectiveness?
o Is a military force composed largely of the
poor, disadvantaged, and otherwise disaffected
members of society a "reliable" force? Will
racial or ethnic minorities, if summoned into
118 Survey teams visited military installations throughout
the country and spoke with commanders from squadron, battalion
and ship levels and above. The ranks of the commanders ranged
from captain (0-3) to major general (0-8), and the average time-
in-service for the commanders was 19 years. See Defense Manpower
Commission, Defense Manpower , p. 157.
119 Ibid., pp. 156-157. See also Coffey et al., "Socio-
Economic Composition," pp. 36-42, 48-49, 58-68, for a more complete
description of the survey and results.
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action for civil disturbances, decide they
owe a higher" fealty to their own community
than to the government?
o Since individuals are responsive to their own
reference groups, values, group memberships,
ethnic origins, and so on, how necessary is a
"balance" of diversified interests? For
instance, what effect will an unrepresentative
enlisted force have on civil-military rela-
tions? Does civilian control exist primarily
in the plurality of thought and conflicting
interests of various civilian groups in the
Armed Forces? Does an unrepresentative
military therefore pose a threat to democratic
government; and can the omnipresent
"military-industrial complex" be controlled?
Will military homogeneity act to provide a
band of professional killers, mercenaries, or
"hired guns" with little stake in civilian
society? Will the loss of an identity of
thought between the military and society
result in a self-serving army of career-minded
"employees "--unwill ing to pay the price of
patriotism in battle?
These concerns have all been expressed at some point either
directly preceding or during the operation of the current all-
volunteer system; and each, in its own way, is enough to cast
some shadow of doubt upon the effectiveness of an unrepresentative
military force. Other questions, then, are these: What influence
does a less of public confidence in the military, created by public
perceptions of a socially unrepresentative force, have on civil-
military relations and military effectiveness? What effect will
public doubt or mistrust of the Armed Forces have on recruitment,
oversight, budgets, and other areas? Will public awareness of
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inequities in military participation fuel disharmony and social
protest, as it did during the period of the Vietnam War?
The composition of the military may equally affect the image
of American life and American defense capabilities abroad. It
has been suggested, for example, that combat units overweighted
with minorities and the disadvantaged will not have credibility
in the world arena; and a loss of credibility limits military
policy options. ^ u On another level, such units may not effec-
tively project (or symbolically represent) the goals of U.S.
domestic and foreign policy. 21
It is likely that the overall effectiveness of the American
Armed Forces is somehow influenced by factors related to the
social composition of their membership. The manner and degree of
influence, the important social variables, the point at which
representation disparities create effectiveness problems, and
related issues are still left mainly to speculation in the liter-
ature. The Armed Forces, fortunately, have not reached the degree
of divergence from the civilian population where serious effective-
ness problems would be apparent (though some critics of the current
all-volunteer military may believe otherwise) .
4. CURRENTS OF ^THOUGHT THROUGH AMERICAN HISTORY
The overrepresentation of blacks and other minorities in the
American military is clearly a source of concern for some people,
primarily mainstream whites. The concern, of course, is hardly
new— and neither are the reasons. In fact, the student of American
12^ See, for example, Morris Janowitz, "Blacks in the Military:
Are There Too Many?", Focus 3 (June 1975): 3-5.
12-1-where military service is perceived as a "burden," a
disproportionately large number of minorities or disadvantaged
servicemembers is seen to reflect inequities in society and the
system of government. "Human rights" and democracy in practice
are thus laid open to criticism. The image of the American
military and what it represents extends from, the highest levels
of foreign policy to troop-community relations abroad.
79
military history can find running currents of thought, from the
days of the colonial militia to present, regarding blacks and
their place in the Armed Forces.
In 1639, when the colony of Virginia issued the first pro-
vision barring blacks from military service, there was a prevalent
fear of slave revolts and the possible consequences of training
slaves in the use of arms. Free black militiamen, it was believed,
might even support the cause of rebellious slaves and turn their
weapons on white colonists. The American colonies therefore
developed a policy of restricting the participation of blacks in
military affairs, "lest our slaves when armed might become our
masters . "122
During the American Revolution, white supremacists viewed
blacks as inherently inferior and untrustworthy. Powerful slave-
holders opposed militia recruitment policies for blacks that
offered runaways a refuge and other slaves a pathway to eventual
freedom. Other colonial leaders considered it morally wrong to
ask slaves and former slaves to share in the burdens of defense
alongside whites. In response to these pressures and with the
support of the Continental Congress, General Washington issued an
order in 1775 prohibiting any new enlistments of blacks.
A number of blacks (mostly in the South) joined the British
forces against the American colonists, believing that a British
victory would bring emancipation. The Continental Congress later
allowed free black soldiers to reenlist in an effort to prevent
defections by blacks and to deal with a critical shortage of
colonial manpower. Several states also defied the wishes of
Congress by actively recruiting free blacks to fill their draft
quotas. One state, in desperate need of able-bodied fighters,
even authorized the formation of an all-black battalion, the
members of which were guaranteed freedom and equal pay and bene-
fits.
199
-'-^Quarles , The Negro in the American Revolution , pp. 13-14.
80
Questions of loyalty were raised covering the service of
blacks in the colonial * forces . The questions were seemingly
within reason. After all, why should slaves or former slaves,
treated as they were, defend the very society and government that
kept them underfoot? What sort of powerful allegiance would
prevent a slave, when armed by his master, from turning around
and shooting his master at the very first opportunity?
Doubts about loyalty and patriotism have been pinned on
blacks and members of other racial or ethnic groups throughout
the history of this country, and some of these views are still
held today. The race riots of the 1960s and the emergence of
black militancy have helped to preserve and strengthen this public
perception in modern times. As the war raged in Vietnam, some
black leaders at home spoke of the racist policies of the Selective
Service System and the genocidal master plan pitting black soldiers
against the people of another colored race. At the same time, as
Newark, Detroit, Watts, and the nation's capital witnessed violent
unrest, black militants cried "burn, baby, burn" and rumors quickly
spread throughout the inner cities that "brothers" were shipping
disassembled K-60 machine guns from Saigon in boxes marked "stereo
equipment.
"
Wartime adversaries were said to have preyed upon the supposed
embitterment and smoldering hostility of black troops by reminding
them of their situation at home and promising them a better life.
This strategy worked in the eighteenth century, though never
again. It often backfired, infuriating blacks and strengthening
their personal resolve. As recently as 1985, the tactic was tried
by Libyan leader Moammar Khadafy, who urged black U.S. servicemen
to leave the military and establish their own, separate army.
"This country [the United States] must be destroyed," Khadafy
said in a speech to a Nation of Islam conference. "They [whites]
refuse to accept you as American citizens. This means you are
obliged to create a separate and independent state. The whites
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force ycu to do this by refusing you in political and social
life." 123
This particular line of thinking— that blacks are somewhat
less patriotic than whites and that a wedge of racial divisiveness
can be driven through the nation's fighting force— is understand-
ably reprehensible to many members of the black, as well as white,
community. More to the point, suspicions are raised that black
troops might be unwilling to carry out their assignments in certain
domestic situations, such as a ghetto riot or other civil disturb-
ance. These suspicions were, in fact, supported by an actual
incident involving the "Fort Hood 43," a group of black soldiers
of the Army^s 1st Armored Division at Fort Hood, Texas, who refused
to deploy for riot duty at the Democratic National Convention in
Chicago in 1968. 124
Similar fears of divided group loyalties kept the British
government from sending Irish regiments into Northern Ireland
during the 1970s. It has also influenced Soviet manning policy--
seen in the key principle of "extraterritoriality"—where Soviet
soldiers are not allowed to serve in their native regions but are
stationed in geographically and ethnically different outposts. ^ J
123
"Khadafy Urges Black Servicemen to Form Separate Army in
U.S.," Monterey Peninsula Herald (Associated Press), 26 February
1985, p. 3.
12i The group included twenty-six Vietnam veterans. According
to press accounts, one of the veterans said: "We shouldn't have
to go out there and do wrong to our own people. I can't see
myself spraying tear gas on my fellow people." And an Army offi-
cial was quoted as saying, "The problem is so fearful that we
won't even discuss these people as Negroes." ( Time , 13 September
1968.)
125 S. Enders Wimbush and Alex Alexiev, The Ethnic Factor in
the Soviet Armed Forces , R-2787/1 (Santa Monica, Ca.: Rand, March
1982), p. 12. In fact, the Soviet experience is similar to the
American experience with blacks. As Wimbush observes in a tele-
vision documentary: "It is not uncommon to find large percentages
of Central Asians, say 75 to 80 percent, in construction battalions
where they have received, at the very most, one or two hours of
training with a rifle. Many we know about saw their only weapon
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When the U.S. took military action in the Dominican Republic
in 1965, rebel forces tried to persuade black American soldiers
to "turn your guns on your white oppressors and join your Dominican
brothers . "l^" They did not. But no matter: what has been in
the methods of the Dominican rebels, the North Vietnamese, the
Libyan leader, and the Japanese, Germans, and North. Koreans before
them, has also been in the thoughts and fears of some white Ameri-
cans. A chairman of the board of the NAACP has characterized the
loyalty issue as a "smokescreen thrown up by more subtle, sophis-
ticated racists." ^27 Racist or not, the running current of
mistrust has survived two centuries of wartime tests and life in
America's melting pot, and it lives on today.
Although blacks were barred from bearing arms in the armies
of colonial America, regulations often required free blacks to
serve as drummers, fifers, laborers, and assorted auxiliary
workers. (An estimated 5,000 blacks, including those with the
Continental Navy, the state navies, and privateers, nonetheless
fought with the colonial forces.) Blacks accounted for about 9
to 10 percent of the Union Army (and one-quarter of enlistments
in the Navy) during the Civil War, suffering a mortality rate
or handled their own weapon when they took their military oath,
and some of them have informed us that, in fact, the weapon was
made of wood. What it amounts to is a systematic policy of segre-
gating minorities—Central Asians, Caucasians, Baits, and Western
Ukrainians primarily— from positions of military responsibility
and especially from high-technology positions." A former Soviet
lieutenant expands on this theme: "Most European Russian soldiers
dislike the Asians, calling them by insulting names like 'animals. 1
The Asians are subordinate and badly educated, spending most of
their time either asleep or getting first in line for dinner. The
senior officers don't like them because they're lazy. So they
put them in construction units, who are almost all Asians, doing
hard labor with pick and shovel." (Quotations are from "The Red
Army," World No. 404, Public Broadcasting Station (PBS) WGEH, May
6, 1981.)
126Moskos, The American Enlisted Man , p. 130.
19 7x * "All-Vol Critics Accused of Racism," Army Times , 1 Auaust
1980.
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almost 40 percent higher than that of white troops. By the out-
break of World War I, blacks were back serving in menial occupa-
tions—supply, stevedore, engineer, and labor crews—within peri-
pheral units. About 200,000 black soldiers served in France
during World War I, and about eight out of ten were assigned as
laborers in the Service of Supplies. The Navy enlisted around
10,000 blacks during the war, assigning most as messmen, stewards,
or coal passers in the firerooms.
At the close of World War II, blacks comprised less than
three percent of all men assigned to combat arms in the Army,
while almost four out of five were relegated to the service
branches. Until 1944, all of the Navy's 165,000 blacks were
assigned to the stewards' branch (where blacks were nicknamed
"cooks and bellhops at sea"). Prior to World War II, the Marine
Corps was able to avoid the racial assignment issue entirely by
accepting only white volunteers. Eventually, the manpower demands
of the war effort led to the required induction of blacks in the
Navy and Marine Corps; but difficulties in creating separate
facilities and segregated units limited both the number of blacks
and nature of available jobs in these Services.
Forty years following the end of World War I—two-hundred-
plus years after the Peace of Paris—blacks can still be found
filling the ranks of functional support, supply, and service-
oriented jobs in numbers disproportionate to their representation
in the military. And all indicators suggest that this is a trend
destined to endure.
The exigencies of war have pried open the doors of American
military service to blacks. During the Revolutionary War, the
colonies were more or less compelled to put blacks in the fighting.
Colonists in the North who were drafted to meet state levies also
used slaves as "substitutes," a practice that quickly became
popular. Only in the lower South did the continuing fear of
slave revolts prevail over the urgent needs of the war and sustain
provisions barring the enlistment of blacks.
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During the early days of the Civil War, blacks were purposely
excluded from service in the Union Army by the Lincoln Adminis-
tration to maintain the loyalty of border states and to focus the
cause of the struggle on the preservation of the Union rather
than on the abolition of slavery. Even so, some black regiments
were formed by Union generals without authorization as soon as
white volunteers became scarce. The Emancipation Proclamation
formally provided for the enlistment of blacks, and active recruit-
ing efforts quickly followed its issuance in 1863. The nation's
first draft law was passed within the next two months, and the
states began to assemble volunteer black units whose enlistees
could then be counted in the states' draft quotas. President
Lincoln later admitted that the participation of blacks in the
Civil War had been crucial, ensuring a Northern victory and preser-
vation of the Union. 2 °
In the early days of World War II, blacks were viewed as
manpower problems rather than assets. Segregation was a part of
the American way, and the military establishment believed that
any other arrangement would undermine unit efficiency and create
racial friction. Special treatment for blacks was thus required:
all-black units had to be carefully situated so that objections
from surrounding communities were minimal; special training staffs
and separate facilities, including black-only blood banks, were
considered essential; existing policies called for separate assign-
ment, classification, and replacement processes to segregate
units and distribute blacks to different branches; and special
procedures were needed for identifying men by race to limit the
number of black draftees.
In December 1944, shortages of infantry riflemen replacements
in the European theater pushed the Army to convert physically
qualified men from the communication zone's all-black units into
combat troops. The original plan, later changed, promised blacks
1 n o
-LZ,
°Jack D. Foner, Blacks and the Military in American History:
A New Perspective (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1974), p. 48.
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that they would be assigned "without regard to color or race to
the units where assistance is most needed, and give you the




The Army sent about 2,800 black troops, hurriedly retrained
as infantrymen, to fight beside white troops in France, Belgium,
and Germany. As the Battle of the Bulge intensified, all-black
platoons were combined with white platoons and put into action as
elements of eleven divisions of the U.S. First and Seventh armies.
Historian Ulysses Lee would later write in the Army's official
account of the war that "the Army found that it was the 10 percent
of American manpower which was Negro that spelled a large part of
the difference between the full and wasteful employment of
available American manpower of military age.''-*- ^
In 1948, President Harry Truman issued Executive Order 9981,
v/hich "declared to be the policy of the President that there
shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in
the armed services without regard to race, color, religion, or
national origin," and that promotions were to be based "solely on
merit and fitness." Two years later, the Army became the last
1 o q
"^^The original letter was later modified because it was
felt that the plan to use black troops constituted an unnecessarily
radical break with traditional Army policy and existing regula-
tions; further, it might prove embarrassing to the War Department.
A revised letter was therefore prepared, changing all but the
first two sentences of the original and no longer promising "the
opportunity of fighting shoulder to shoulder." A cover memorandum
also ordered the return and destruction of all' copies of the
original version--but by the time the revised letter and new
orders were released, the first letter had already been distributed
to most of the units. Ulysses G. Lee, The United States Army in
World War II, Special Studies: The Employment of Negro Troops
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S.
Army, 1966), pp. 689-691.
130 Ibid., pp. 703-704.
131Executive Order 9981, Federal Register , Vol. 13, 28 July
1948, p. 4313. See also Freedom to Serve: Equality of Treatment
and Opportunity in the Armed Services , Report by the President's
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Service to officially submit a plan for unrestricted "equality of
treatment and opportunity."
Despite the desegregation order and blueprint for a color-
blind policy, the outbreak of the Korean War found a still-segre-
gated Army—but this time with the all-black 24th Infantry Regiment
committed to combat duty. Blacks were joining the Army in large
numbers, and by the middle of 1951 one out of every four new
recruits was black. 32 Black training units in the United States
and service units in Korea could no longer absorb the rapidly
increasing number of black enlistees. The Army, too, was faced
with a shortage of men in white units, especially those on the
front lines in Korea. Military necessity eventually prevailed
over procedure and forced integration of both training units and
combat units. Soon, all Army basic training centers were inte-
grated and blacks were being assigned freely to combat units. By
the end of the war, it was said that "young Negro recruits serving
in Korea found it hard to believe that an all-Negro regiment had
ever existed." 133
In contrast to the two World Wars and the early days of
Korea when blacks had to "fight for the right to fight," the
Vietnam War brought charges that blacks were doing more than
their fair share of the fighting. Indeed, it was said that blacks
and other disadvantaged youths were being sent to Southeast Asia
as "substitutes" for the draft-deferred sons of the privileged
classes; that "special efforts" and methods actually favored the
recruitment of blacks over whites; that the "better off" were
also the better-protected, insulated from the draft through
"channeling" policies and a wide array of income-based devices,
while blacks were being systemically marched off to battle.
Committee (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950).
TOO
Milton, Utilization of Negro Manpower , p. 5 69.
33 Ulysses G. Lee, "The Draft and the Negro," Current History
55 (July 1968) : 33.
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In fact, between 1961 and 1966, when blacks comprised about
11 percent of the general population aged 19 to 21, black
casualties amounted to almost one-fourth of all losses of Army
enlisted personnel in Vietnam (a situation that was, however, later
corrected) . To the black community, perhaps the most distressing
aspect of Selective Service inequities was that the Armed Forces
were apparently sending the "best" young men—those who were
educated and healthy but not deferred--to fight in Vietnam. The
majority of blacks who applied to the military (conscripts or
volunteers) were rejected because of inadequate education or poor
health. Those who were being accepted, according to Whitney Young,
were the "cream of the crop" from the black neighborhoods—the
"potential forces of leadership. . . in the battle cry for freedom
at home . " ^4 They were the young, virile, income-producing males,
the "shining lights of tomorrow" who were leaving a leadership
vacuum in the black community that could not be easily filled. 135
While the exigencies of war have helped to bring racial
equity to the military, the participation of blacks in combat has
probably helped to bring improved civil rights to the larger
society. In colonial America, slaves who demonstrated their
courage under fire were sometimes promised freedom—while free
blacks held the hope of elevating their lov; social status. Militia
recruitment policies were thus seen to offer runaways a refuge
and other slaves a pathway out of bondage. Similarly, during
World War I, many blacks pegged their hopes for a better future
on involvement in the war and many black leaders hoped to use the
Army as a vehicle for social change. W.E.B. Dubois, for instance,
believed in 1917 that "if the black man could fight to defeat the
134Whitney M. Young, Jr., "When the Negroes Come Home," p. 66.
135 Robert D. Tollison, "Racial Balance and the Volunteer
Army," in Why the Draft ?, James C. Miller III, ed. (Baltimore:
Penguin Books, Inc., 1968), p. 149; and Marmion, The Case , p. 34.
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Kaiser ... he could later present a bill for payment due to a
grateful white America. "136
"A grateful white America" was nowhere to be found at the
close of the First World War, nor at the final return of troops
from Korea or Vietnam. In the case of Vietnam, there could be no
question of the fact that blacks carried their fair share of the
load--that blacks paid the "price in blood" for entrance into the
mainstream, the price of full citizenship. On television sets
across the country, every middle American could witness in living
color the battlefield bravery of young men, white and black
together. And, all too often, the faces of the soldiers television
viewers saw were those of black youngsters pressed into service
by the powerful hand of their own poverty. So it follows, as one
writer observed during the height of the v/ar, this demonstration
of patriotism and courage by black soldiers had become an agent
of equal opportunity and civil rights: "History may record that
the single most important psychological event in race relations
in the 1960s was the appearance of Negro fighting men on the TV
screens of America. Acquiring a reputation for military valor is
1 "37
one of the oldest known routes to social equality . " XJ '
136Ambrose, "Blacks in Two World Wars," pp. 178-179.
"1 "37
-^'Daniel P. Moynihan, "Who Gets in the Army?," New Republic ,
5 November 1966, p. 22. In fact, the absorption of immigrants
into the American melting pot has been achieved historically
through the "blood test"--you proved you loved America through
allegiance and sacrifice and dying for the country in its wars.
As Michael Novak observes in The Rise of the Unmeltable Ethnics:
Politics and Culture in the Seventies (New York: Macmillan, 1972),
pp. xxi-xxii, when the Poles were only about 4 percent of the
U.S. population in 1917-19, they accounted for over 12 percent of
the nation's casualties in World War I. The "fighting Irish" did
not win that epithet on the playing fields of Notre Dame but by
dying in droves during the American Civil War. Victor Hicken
points out in The American Fighting Man (New York: Macmillan,
1969), p. 365, that the sansei, because of Pearl Harbor and sub-
sequent discrimination, felt compelled to prove their loyalty to
America on the battlefield "with a vengeance." Thus, according
to Morris Janowitz, "from World War I onward, citizen military
service has been seen as a device by which excluded segments of
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His tor ically , social and economic depression has had an
unyielding grasp on blacks in this country. This is one important
reason why blacks have always found a special appeal in military
membership—offering a steady job and income, improved living
conditions, training, education, employment experience, and the
status that accompanies honorable service to the nation. It is
estimated that during the Civil War, over 200,000 black soldiers
and freedmen were educated in the Army's schools, while former
slaves were "the most numerous and earnest pursuers of
1 o olearning."-1- 00 After the Civil War, a Congressional authorization
created six black regiments in the regular Army (later reduced to
two infantry and two cavalry regiments). These units, led by
white officers, fought Indians and filled outposts in the West--
and they seldom, if ever, had vacancies.
It can probably be said that there has never since been a
shortage of black manpower: the "supply" available for military
service has invariably exceeded the prescribed "demand." Even
during the days of World War II, when the country experienced its
most massive mobilization, blacks were barred from volunteering.
Prior to the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the Army permitted enlist-
ments by blacks only to fill vacancies in existing black units
that were also held understrength. After the outbreak of the
War, as a Selective Service report notes, "there was no welcome
for Negroes." "It was announced officially that there was 'no
room in the Army for more Negroes at present. 1 This action was
difficult to understand since the Nation was then engaged in a
ion
conflict which threatened its existence."-1-^ (The Navy allowed
limited enlistments of blacks in the messmen's branch. The Marine
society could achieve political legitimacy and rights" (from "Mili-
tary Institutions and Citizenship in Western Societies," Armed
Forces and Society 2 [Winter 1976]: 192).
138 Historian Bell I. Wiley cited in Foner, Blacks and the
Military , p 40.
I T> Q
Selective Service System, Special Groups , Volume I (Wash-
ington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 26.
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Corps did not accept blacks in any capacity.) "Who has a better
right to volunteer in a fight for freedom and democracy than the'
colored men of America?," Congressman Hamilton Fish of New York and
others asked. Nonetheless, severe restrictions against the
enlistment of blacks in the Army survived the entire Second World
War. 140
Now, in the days of all-volunteer recruitment, blacks are
still strongly drawn to service in the nation's military forces.
It should come as no surprise: blacks continue to stand far
beneath whites on America's socioeconomic ladder. This fact is
especially evident in the jobless rate of teenaged black males,
which has hovered at around 40 or 50 percent for several years-
more than twice the level experienced by white teenagers. At the
same time, unemployment among minority youths has more than doubled
over the past ten years--and, even though the average level of
education for young blacks has increased, proportionately more
black high school graduates than white high school dropouts were
jobless and looking for work in the early 1980s. 41
Surveys continue to show that blacks join the military for
"a chance to better myself in life" and for the many opportunities
which cannot be obtained as easily in the civilian community.
Still, the common factor that influences the overall attractive-
ness of the military, particularly for young black males, is the
dismal civilian labor market that confronts them. They are, as
noted above, much more likely to be unemployed and, when employed,
more likely to earn less than their white contemporaries.
The degree to which military recruitment patterns can be
attributed to changes in the labor market is a contentious
issue—but recent research has revealed important differences by
race, differences that raise the specter of a recruiting practice
popular long ago. Analysts who have attempted to distinguish
between the enlistment response of white and minority youths to
140 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
L41 Ford Foundation, Not Working , p. 18.
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variations in unemployment, it seems, have consistently measured
a significantly smaller response from, blacks; and, in some cases,
the changes in enlistment rates have been in an opposite direction
from the shifting rates of unemployment. For example, while a 10
percent increase in white youth unemployment is found to result
in a 5 percent increase in high-quality white volunteers, a similar
increase in black youth unemployment would be expected to yield a
6 percent decrease in black volunteers with similar qualitative
characteristics . 42
The different enlistment response of whites and blacks to
shifts in unemployment is probably a manifestation of what has
been called the "substitution effect": during periods of rising
unemployment, when the Services are able to attract more high
school graduates who have scores in the higher aptitude categories,
they are typically less inclined to accept volunteers with- lower
levels of education or lower aptitude test scores. Applicants
with higher qualitative profiles—gauged mainly by education and
performance on a paper-and-pencil test measuring verbal and quan-
titative skills— are thus preferred over those who are lower en
the scale. The fact that white youths are more likely to be in
the former group and blacks in the latter means that white youths,
on the average, will be more "preferred" than black youths during
the better recruiting times; and, conversely, blacks may be "sub-
stituted" for whites when service in the military becomes generally
less desirable.
The use of blacks as "substitutes" for whites, the poor as
"substitutes" for the more affluent, and vice versa, is an estab-
lished practice at least as old as the American military itself.
Indeed, history shows that this nation has denied members of
certain social categories entrance into military service when it
was important to them to serve and has protected members of other
groups when it was important to them not to serve. From the days
of the American Revolution and the Civil War, when draftees could
142 See Binkin and Eitelberg, "Women and Minorities," p. 77.
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pick their own "substitutes," to the days of the Vietnam War,
when the machinery of conscription busily "channeled" its take,
power and economic privilege have played an important part in
military manning methods. Even today, it could be said that white
young men are the main beneficiaries— indirectly and at the expense
of blacks— of Service screening policies that place a premium on
education and aptitude test performance.
Another running current of thought relates to the continuing
perception by some that an improper balance or mixing of the
races in military units will impair personnel performance and
overall effectiveness. When racial segregation was the accepted
social practice, it was deemed appropriate for the military as
well—and the Armed Forces went to great lengths to prevent the
intermingling of black and white troops.
In the early days of the Civil War, military leaders in the
Union Army pressured President Lincoln to bar blacks from enlist-
ing, fearing that the presence of black soldiers v/ould cause
disharmony .and drive away white volunteers. During the two World
Wars, it was likewise felt that integration of any sort v/ould
harm unit efficiency, give rise to racial tensions, and arouse
the ingrained racist spirits of white soldiers. During World War
II, the Navy went so far as to commission two ships with all-black
enlisted crews— a destroyer-escort and a subchaser— in an exper-
iment testing the capabilities of blacks to perform in jobs other
than messman. 43 (The "lily-white Navy" v/as not so-named solely
because of its well-laundered uniforms.) Some Defense planners,
recognizing both the need for segregation and the requirement for
added black manpower, at one point seriously considered setting
143 The USS Mason (DE-529) was designated as the
destroyer-escort and the USS PC 1264 was named the subchaser in
this experiment. See Eric Purdon, Black Company: The Story of
Subchaser 1264 (New York: Robert B. Luce, Inc., 1972).
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up a special basic training post for black recruits--as far away
as possible from the racial animosity of whites--in Antarctica . 144
In 1950, the Army's Board to Study the Utilization of Negro
Manpower reported that widespread integration, however desirable
as a social measure, and abolition of the 10-percent ceiling on
black soldiers would markedly reduce combat efficiency and unit
morale. The Army further contended that its racial policies were
not dictated by racial prejudice, but by two conditions: most
whites do not associate with blacks, and blacks, through no fault
of their own, do not have the skills or education required for
many of the Army's occupational specialties. 45
Several years earlier, the Navy had refused to integrate its
ships for many of the same reasons. The Navy's General Board, in
a written report, stated that discrimination "is but part and
parcel of similar discrimination throughout the United States,
not only against the Negro, but in the Pacific States and in
Hawaii against citizens of Asiatic descent." The reasons for
this, the report continued, "are rather generally that: (a) the
white man will not accept the Negro in a position of authority
over him; (b) the white man considers that he is of a superior
race and will not admit the Negro as an equal; and (c) the v/hite
man refuses to admit the Negro to intimate family relationships
leading to marriage." 146
144 Richard J. Stillman, Integration of the Negro in the U.S.
Armed Forces (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968), p. 5.
145From the report of the Chamberlin Board (Board to Study
the Utilization of Negro Manpower) , examined in Milton, Utilization
of Negro Manpower , pp. 579-581. Also reviewed are other supporting
studies by the Army in the early 1950s on the limited use of
black troops— including officer surveys and reports, Army student
reports, Army committee studies, and attitude surveys of black and
white soldiers. The Board later concluded that integrated combat
units performed better than segregated ones, but that it v/as
necessary to reimpose the quota and to retain some separate black
units.
- 4
°Purdon, Black Company , pp. 17-18.
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The Korean War coincided with the desegregation of the Armed
Forces, and. it afforded an unusual opportunity to test the* effec-
tiveness of integration on a large scale. The most notable
research undertaking of the period, "Project Clear," concluded in
1951 that "racial segregation limits the effectiveness of the
Army," while "integration enhances the effectiveness of the
Army. "-^ ' The Korean War consequently put to rest, at least on
the surface, not only doubts about the individual effectiveness
of black soldiers, but also fears that integration would have
adverse consequences for group solidarity and hence unit perform-
ance.
During the Vietnam War, it was said that some company com-
manders practiced "discr iminat ion- in-reverse" so that combat
platoons would contain a proportional balance of the races.
However, these actions were taken not for racial harmony, but for
the purpose of keeping black casualty counts down to a mere "repre-
sentative" level and distributing combat burdens more equitably.
Now, under the all-volunteer system, some public officials
can be heard calling for a "balanced mix" of blacks and whites in
the Armed Forces, once again premised on the grounds of unit
effectiveness and improved racial relations. Sociologists in the
1970s also spoke of the inherent racism of the American people,
the possibility of "white flight" from the military, and the
prospect that a "tipping point" (where disproportionately high
black membership drives away white volunteers) could be reached,
causing "a significant diminishment of white recruits for the
1 & ftground force units involved
.
" ±HO Meanwhile, the Army Secretary
147 See Milton, Utilization of Negro Manpower ; and Leo Bogart,
ed. , Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army: Two
Original 1951 FieJd Reports (Mew York: Markham, 1969).
1 A ftL4
°See, for example, Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Symposium: Race
in the United States Military," Armed Forces and Society 6 (Summer
1980): 593. The "white flight" comment is from testimony by Rep.
Robin L. Beard, in Status of the All-Volunteer Force , Hearing
before the Subcommittee on Manpower and Personnel, Senate Committee
on Armed Services, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. (Washington, D.C: Govern-
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himself acknowledged in 1977 that his Service had to virtually
rebuild its corps of noncommissioned officers "who were hostile
1 a qto the increased number of blacks. " x ^ y And others have observed
a recent deterioration of race relations and a rising tide of
lCf]
racial bigotry aimed at blacks in uniform.
World War I, it has been found, also brought three important
legacies that continue to influence opinions about blacks and the
military. - 1 First, in response to the highly publicized failures
of certain all-black fighting units in France, such as the 368th
Regiment of the 92nd "Buffalo" Division, came the viev; that blacks
generally do not perform well in combat.
Disagreement about the fighting abilities of blacks arose
again during the Second World War. In February 1945, a task
force of the 92nd "Buffalo" Division was pulled out of action
against the German Gothic -Line in Italy after three days of exces-
sive "straggling" and "disorganization." Reports from the field
did not mention the many acts of individual and group bravery,
but instead spoke generally of panic-stricken infantrymen who
would "melt away" in the heat of battle. Subsequent evalua-
tions of the performance of black troops in the War pointed out
that the units were poorly prepared and trained; and that the
ment Printing Office, 1978), p. 69.
149 New York Times , 11 January 1977, cited in Binkin and
Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military , p. 106.
150 Tom Philpott, "EO Programs Downgrading Found," Army Times ,
23 March 1981, p. 1, 23; and Lothar H. Wedekind, "GIs in the Klan:
A Look Under Their Hoods," Army Times Magazine , 7 July 1980, p. 5.
1J1Charles H. Coates and Roland J. Pellegrin, Military
Sociology (University Park, Md . : The Social Science Press, 1965),
pp. 342-343. See also Eli Ginzberg, The Negro Potential (Mew
York: Columbia University Press, 1956), pp. 62-64.
ICO
Lee Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front (New York:
Random House, 1954), p. 16; and Lee, Employment of Negro Troops ,
p. 576.
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conditions of second- or third- or fourth-class citizens did not
contribute to the development of first-class soldiers
.
15 ^
Most assessments of the performance of black troops at this
time skirted the question of the quality of their leaders, most
of whom were white. But there is ample evidence to suggest that
at least some of the blame for the poor shov/ing of black units
should rest on inferior leadership. Black units "often became,
as they had in earlier wars, dumping grounds for officers unwanted
in white units." 154 Moreover, many white officers resented being
assigned to a black unit, seeing it as a stigma, and slow road to
nowhere. The Army often aggravated the situation "by showing a
preference for officers of southern birth and training," who were
ICC
particularly resented by the black troops. JJ
In the first days of the Korean War, reports circulated
about the unreliability of black soldiers, who allegedly would
"melt into the night" only to turn up the next day insisting they
had been lost. JU By war's end, with more than 90 percent of all
blacks in the Army assigned to integrated units, there was little
purpose in questioning the fighting abilities of blacks. After
each war, one commentator observed in 1947, it was always necessary
to again ask, "Do Negroes make good soldiers?" 15 ' After Korea,
when there was no longer a need to justify racial segregation, it
was no longer appropriate to single out blacks for special study.
1 coiJJ Eli Gmzberg et al., The Ineffective Soldier: Lessons for
Management and the Nation, Volume I : The Lost Divisions (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1959), pp. 124-125; and Lee,
Employment of Negro Troops , pp. 704-705.
•LJ^Moms J. MacGregor, Jr., Integration of the Armed Forces ,




156Nichols, Breakthrough on the Color Front , p. 20.
J
'Jean Byer, The Study of the Negro in Military Service
(Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, June 1947). (Processed.)
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In the modern era, questions are instead asked about the
soldierly abilities of persons with lower aptitude test scores or
less formal education. As pointed out, "there is historical
evidence to support the views of most military professionals that
increasing the number of better-educated, more intelligent soldiers
would improve combat effectiveness. Studies of combat soldiers
in World War II and the Korean War showed that soldiers with
higher education and mental scores were rated as better fighters
by peers and immediate supervisors." 158 This does not mean that
"being middle class or educated makes one braver or more able."
But it does lead to the conclusion that the "chemistry of unit
cohesion . . . requires a blend of talents and backgrounds"--
with the increased participation of "middle-class and upwardly-
mobile youth." 159 Unfortunately for blacks, proportionately more
whites happen to fall into the category of better-educated,
middle class, and upwardly mobile youth.
Race riots at military installations in the South just prior
to World War I brought another legacy to perceptions concerning
blacks and the military--mainly , the feeling that military-civilian
clashes or internal, racially motivated uprisings would eventually
become frequent and quite serious. The infamous "Brownsville
Affray" of 1906—when black soldiers allegedly rioted in protest
against their treatment by the townspeople of Brownsville, Texas--
was one of the most publicized incidents cf the period. The
Brownsville episode ended with President Theodore Roosevelt
ordering the dishonorable discharge of three entire black companies
15 °Charles C. Moskos and John H. Faris, "Beyond the Market-
place: National Service and the AVF , " in Toward A Consensus on
Military Service , Goodpaster et al.,eds., p. 138.
159 Ibid.
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without trial by court-martial (an action that was ultimately
reversed by the Army and byCongress in the early 1970s). *-v0
The "legacy" was reinforced eleven years later when a more
violent, if less well-known, incident involving the men of the
all-black 24th Infantry occurred in Houston, Texas. In retaliation
for their own mistreatment and the alleged abuse of a black woman
by white policemen, more than a hundred members of the Army unit
mutinied against their officers, seized rifles and ammunition by
force, and marched upon downtown Houston. Several policemen,
citizens, and soldiers were killed, and many more were wounded.
The War Department reacted by indicting 118 black soldiers and
convicting all but eight on charges of murder and mutiny. Thirteen
men were subsequently hanged in a "speedy execution," apparently
for the benefit of the townspeople; another six soldiers were
•later hanged; 63 were sentenced to life imprisonment; and the
rest were given dishonorable discharges and prison terms ranging
from two to fifteen years. 62
A major problem faced by blacks in the Armed Forces during
the late 1950s stemmed from the racism that prevailed in many
communities surrounding military installations. Black service
members not only faced the hostility of many civilians, but had
160 Marvin Fletcher, The Black Soldier and Officer in the
United States Army , 1891-1917 (Columbia: University of Missouri
Press, 1974), pp. 119-152; and Foner, Blacks and the Military ,
pp. 9 6-103.
161 Edgar A. Shuler, "The Houston Race Riot, 1917," in Allen
D. Grimshaw, ed., Racial Violence in the United States (Chicago:
Aldine Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 73-87. In 1944 Gunnar Myrdal
observed: "During his entire military history in the country, the
Negro has experienced numerous humiliations of various kinds. He
has been abused because of his race by many white officers, by
white soldiers and by white civilians. There have been race riots
in or around camps. The Negro soldier has usually been punished
most severely when he was only one offender among many, and some-
times even when he was the victim. See An American Dilemma: The
Negro Problem and Modern Democracy (New York: Harper and Row,
Publishers, 1944), p. 421.
162 Foner, Blacks and the Military , pp. 113-116.
99
difficulty finding decent living accommodations, restaurants, and
schools. Although the Pentagon was acutely aware of this discrim-
ination, there was "no evidence that the Department of Defense
ever worked for blacks off the post before the 1960s." 1 " 3
A special study group during the Truman Administration docu-
mented many of the problems faced by blacks. Later, under Presi-
dent Kennedy, the Pentagon began to take a mere active role in
dealing with off-base discrimination. Other steps were also
taken to change the racial climate that seemed to surround most
military installations. ° 4
Concerns about racial conflict surfaced again in the late
1960s. Indeed, incidents with racial overtones seemed to plague
the Vietnam period. Among the most widely publicized were a race
riot by prisoners in a stockade at Long Einh, Vietnam in 19 6 8 and
incidents aboard several Navy vessels (including the aircraft
carriers Kitty Hawk and Constellation , the assault ship Sumpter ,
and the Kassayampa , an oiler, all during the year 1972). Even
the Air Force, which had been virtually free of racial problems,
saw its share of trouble. Four days of rioting in May 1971 at
Travis Air Force Ease were ignited by racial incidents on the
installation. The Travis riot resulted in the arrest of 110
blacks and 25 whites, and more than 30 Air Force personnel were
treated for injuries. " 5 Serious racial clashes also beset the
Marine Corps at Camp Lejeune (July 1969) and at Kanehce Naval Air
Station, Hawaii (August 1969). 166
163 Alan L. Gropman, The Air Force Integrates , 1945-1964
(Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, 1978), p. 155.
164 See President's Committee on Equal Opportunity in the
Armed Forces, Fguality of Treatment and Opportunity for Negro
Military Personnel Stationed Within the United States: Initial
Report (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp.
5, 12, 14.
-^^Gropman, Air Force Integrates , pp. 215-216.
1
"°Adam Yarmolinsky, The Military Establishment ; Impacts on
American Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1971), p. 344.
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The threat of racial unrest has diminished greatly over the
past decade. However, there is some evidence that many youths
entering the all-volunteer military are coming from the most
segregated areas of civilian life where there is little if any
interracial contact. This trend has apparently contributed to a
disturbing increase in Ku Klux Klan-type activities. In fact,
just a few years ago racial incidents involving the KKK were
reported on the aircraft carrier Independence , the supply ship
Concord , and the carrier America . -° ' There have also been reports
of KKK activities at Fort Hood, Texas, Fort Carson, Colorado, and
among Army troops stationed in Europe. ° Though still far from
widespread, the increase in klanism in the Armed Forces is seen
as a dangerous omen and a sad reminder of times past.
The third "legacy" of World War I was the establishment of
aptitude tests as a primary basis for screening and assigning new
recruits. These tests, it is noted, were used by some members of
the scientific community as "indisputable proof" that blacks are
genetically inferior to whites. And, it was widely taught in the
military that "the mental capabilities of most Negroes were slight
and . . . this fact would make their utilization in a future
mobilization very difficult."-'-^ a "typical" study in the 1920s
by the Army War College attributed the relatively poor performance
of blacks on the military's mental test to the apparently smaller
size of their cranial cavity—while those blacks who did score
LD/ Blain Harden, "Sailors Wearing Sheets Create Racial Inci-
dent Aboard Aircraft Carrier," Washington Post , 6 September 1979;
John Stevenson, "Navy Ships, Racial Tension is Under Guarded
Control," Norfolk Virginian-Pilot , 11 November 1979; and "KKK
Activity Investigated Aboard Atlantic Fleet Ships," Washington
Star , 1 July 1979.
1 fci ftLDOThese particular cases have been reported in Army Times
(13 August 1979) and St. Louis Pest-Dispatch (7 December 1980) .
See also Wedekind, "GIs in the Klan." A more recent account of
the alleged participation by soldiers and marines in KKK activities
can be found in Daniel Greene, "DoD Studies Policy on Racist
Group Membership," Army Times , 9 June 1986, p. 19.
•LD
^Coates and Pellegrin, Military Sociology , p. 342.
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well on intelligence tests, the study further concluded, evidently
possessed a "heavy strain of white blood. "-L/u
Military manpower analysts, social scientists, and the general
public still ponder the very v/ide gap between the average test
scores of blacks and whites. This was well illustrated by the
manner in which the popular media treated findings from the "Pro-
file of American Youth" study (nationwide administration of the
military's enlistment test to a representative sample of young men
and women in 1980) . The Washington Post of 21 February 1982 was
the first to reveal the results of the study in a front-page
article entitled "Blacks Score Below Whites in Pentagon Test." A
Baltimore Sun article was captioned "Pentagon Calm at Test Gap of
Whites, Blacks, Hispanics"; while the Chicago Sun Times ran a
headline stating (erroneously) "Blacks Score Half as Well as
Whites in Pentagon Test . " 17 -L
The real story of the "Profile of American Youth," the truly
new finding, as the New York Times correctly observed, was that
"Volunteers in Armed Forces Test 'Above Average'." The Christian
Science Monitor also took a much more subdued approach to the
study results in its article, titled "Pentagon Finds Recruits
t 7 nx u The Army Report is quoted in Cropman, Air Force Integrates ,
p. 2.
x /x See Mark J. Fitelberg, Zahava D. Doering, and Wayne S.
Sellman, "Government Scientists Meet the Press: Reactions to the
Release of the 'Profile of American Youth'," in Department of
Defense, The Profile of American Youth Study : Results and Impli-
cations , Technical Memorandum 82-2 (Washington, D.C.: Directorate
of Accession Policy, September 1982) . The Washington Post article
was the subject of some harsh criticism by its readers— leading
the Washington Post ombudsman to later offer a public apology on
behalf of the paper. The headline and story were "tilted," he
wrote; the article probably received too much attention as the
lead story on the day it appeared; and it took too much play away
from the "principal conclusion of the test: that the All-Volunteer
Force is 'above average.'" (Cited in ibid.) The Associated Press
(AP) later retracted its wire service report, stating that "the
story had erroneously mixed percentile ratings with percentage
scores." The AP also presented a brief explanation of percentile
scores along with a description of the average scores of whites
and blacks— in what amounted to a very unusual "news" article.
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More 'Trainable'": "In general, those who join the Armed Services
score a bit higher than the national average on qualification
tests measuring ' trainability ' . At the same time, at another
extreme, were articles captioned "Study Revives Ethnic Inferiority
Controversy" and columnists claiming that the study marked "a
return to the American-style racism that had diminished long
ago"--a "comeback" for theories of genetic inferiority so that
the new captains of social and economic America can build a case
for renewed racial segregation. J
A major portion of the initial analyses of the "Profile"
study was devoted to a comparison of the test scores of selected
subgroups. The demographic variables used to differentiate popu-
lation subgroups were age, sex, race/ethnicity, level of education,
socioeconomic status, and geographic region. The results of the
subgroup comparisons were generally consistent with the findings
of published research on aptitude and achievement tests
—
demonstrating again the very wide differences between the test
scores of whites and ethnic or racial minorities, particularly
blacks. 174
Disadvantaged youths and minorities will clearly have more
to lose from a "hiring" system that emphasizes academic achievement
and skills in reading and test taking. Reading skills and other
test-taking talents are strongly influenced by the individual's
educational experiences, in terms of both the quality and quantity
of schooling received, as well as by any special social, cultural,
or economic factors that affect the learning process. The dis-
turbing truth for disadvantaged youths and minorities is that
educational opportunities in this country are not equally
179±
'^Eitelberg, Doering, and Sellman, "Government Scientists,"
p. 84.
I 7 Tx J Ibid., p. 85. The referenced article appeared in the St
.
Paul (Mn.) Pioneer Press . The column, entitled "Genetic Inferiority
Returns," was published in the Chicago Tribune .
1 4 See Department of Defense, Profile of American Youth .
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distributed across socioeconomic, geographic, or cultural bound-
aries; and any system that stresses skills stemming directly from
education is bound to favor one population group over another.
In the working world of the modern military, selection stan-
dards operate to make it far less likely that blacks (than whites)
will qualify for enlistment--and, when qualified, will be eligible
for the more preferred jobs. The stumbling block for blacks and
other minorities appears to be the aptitude test, a direct
descendant of the exams that guided the fate of black recruits
over seven decades ago.
Technically, the military's selection standards are as close
to being "color blind" as current scientific knowledge will
permit. The Armed Services are an "equal opportunity employer"
of the highest order, where all individuals, regardless of back-
ground, are treated with fairness and impartiality under prevailing
laws. Nevertheless, everyone carries a certain amount of demo-
graphic cargo; and young people who seek to join the military
must bring with them at least 18 or 19 or more years of develop-
mental history, which, far from being fair, controls their compet-
itive position beside fellow job-seekers.
There can be no question that present enlistment requirements
have a profound effect on the racial and socioeconomic content of
the military and its occupational components. This is the inad-
vertent result of a system that is neither intended nor equipped
to right the wrongs of the social order; a system that must
annually screen over 700,000 applicants, most of vvhom have never
held a previous job, in a mechanical, homogenized, and basically
dispassionate fashion; and a system that must rely on standardized
tests which are equitable and proper, yet so greatly varying in
their difficulty for different groups of people.
In modern practice, it is hard to conceive of a large-scale
hiring operation capable of producing a purely "color blind" work
force. Employers may evaluate all job applicants without bias-
on an individual basis--but all job applicants are obviously not
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equally qualified for every position. Any impartial employment
method short of random choice, then, will inevitably reflect
existing social or racial inequities. The military places great
importance on the results of the enlistment test because standard-
ized testing can be more objective than most other screening
methods. However, the fact remains: blacks and whites are
divided by an average test score gap of striking dimensions (an
AFQT percentile score of 56 for whites compared with a score of
24 for blacks); and enlistment requirements that stress test
performance will tend to favor whites over blacks as a group. *'•>
The Armed Services still emerge from American history as
trail blazers for minority rights. Though change for the better
has frequently been strained and slow, no other public or private
institution in the country can match the great strides for racial
fairness taken by the military since the 1950s. Mo major employer
of young people in this nation, for example, is more aware of the
problems of cultural bias in testing than the Department of
Defense. Selection and assignment practices have been held up to
considerable public scrutiny over the last thirty years, largely
because of two factors or conditions of modern military service.
First, the nature of the military's mission, in war or peace,
places it in full public view, exposed to the watchful eyes of
the popular media, special interest groups, the legislature, and
others; and the great turnover of personnel from one year to the
next creates an avenue of contact with the civilian community.
Second, the end of the draft helped to open the doors of military
service even wider for minorities and women; and at the same
time, concerns over the consequences of all-volunteer recruitment
have led to a profusion of research on manpower policy and prac-
tice.
Some observers may still fault the military for allowing
blacks and other minorities to be clustered in "soft" jobs, or
those positions that are lower in the skill-level or technical
17c
^Aptitude test scores are from ibid., p. 35.
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hierarchy. At first glance, a proponent of equal opportunity
could make the case that the job opportunities for blacks are
somewhat less than equal to the job opportunities for whites (or,
for that matter, other minorities). Yet, there are indications
that black young men have taken a significant step forward in
gaining assignment to the so-called "better" jobs over the past
several years in all Services; and, even though there are persis-
tent disparities between the job experiences of blacks and whites,
blacks are now achieving access to the more preferred military
jobs in much greater proportion than the glaring differences in
aptitude test performance would lead one to expect. It is also
true that blacks and whites are probably more "equal" in the
military than they are in most areas of civilian working life.
On the military's behalf, too, it should be emphasized that
all conceivable efforts have been made to keep racial partiality
in aptitude test results to a minimum. The Department of Defense
has vigorously endeavored to create a fair and effective enlistment
test, and independent testing experts have consistently given the
examination high marks. Furthermore, there is evidence that the
test and its various components are accurate predictors of indivi-
dual performance in training; while "studies of the differential
validity of the ASVAB tests in male and female and White and
Black subpopulat ions show no real evidence of bias, either
favorable or unfavorable, to members of any of these groups."
Critics have reproached the military for relying so heavily
and for so long on aptitude standards that apparently work to the
detriment of certain groups over others (a situation that is
destined to change before the close of this century). '' In the
176 R. Darrel Bock and Elsie G.J. Moore, The Profile of Amer-
ican Youth: Demographic Influences on ASVAB Test Performance
(Washington, D.C.: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
[Manpower, Installations, and Logistics], February 1984), p. 96.
x/
'See, for example, Department of Defense, First Annual
Report to Congress on Joint-Service Efforts to Link Enlistment
Standards and Job Performance (Washington, D.C.: Office of the
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meantime, there is no denying that minorities, especially blacks,
will continue to collect a smaller share than whites of most
opportunities the military has to offer. This is not necessarily
an indictment of the military's methods or selection devices,
which are carefully conceived. It is, rather, a realization that
certain inequities still exist in the nation's social, economic,
and educational fabric from which the military must shape its
force; that the military is just a part of the nation's framework,
an agent of the government, reflecting in varied degrees the best
as well as the worst of its parent setting. It is also a recog-
nition that many currents of thought, some clearly racist, others
drawn from ignorance or misunderstanding, have persistently
followed the military through its entire past; and these currents,
it appears, rr:ay continue to run for some time to come.
5. CONCLUDING NOTE: LOOKING AHEAD
Proponents of population representation in the American
Armed Forces call upon three basic principles to argue their
position: (1) There is a need to have a legitimate military of
"citizen-soldiers" who can "re-present" the variety of community
interests and recreate the social contour of American life; (2)
There must be a fair or equitable system of military service,
where the benefits and burdens (or the rights and responsibilities)
of national defense are distributed justly throughout society;
and (3) Military membership must ensure a capable, cohesive, and
effective fighting force (in symbol as well as in deed).
"Race," defined as white and black, is an important element
of population representation in the American military for several
reasons. In the earliest days of this country, blacks were barred
from service or used very sparingly— and only in the most expedient
circumstances. After a long history of recruitment quotas designed
Assistant Secretary of Defense [Manpower, Reserve Affairs, and
Logistics], December 1982).
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to exclude blacks, the Armed Forces gradually removed their racial
barriers and allowed blacks the "right to fight" in two Asian
wars. Now, under a system of all-volunteer recruitment, the
proportion of blacks serving in the enlisted ranks is extraor-
dinarily high. In the short span of thirty years, the American
military has moved from segregation and exclusion of blacks to
equal opportunity and the prospect of a fighting force filled
with racial and ethnic minorities.
Many proponents of statistical parity believe that the most
effective, fair, and legitimate military forces are those that
mirror society. More importance is placed on certain groups than
on the individuals who constitute these groups because it is a
custom of American life; the awareness of race differences is a
part of the history, law, and symbolism of the nation. As long
as there are tensions and fissures in American race relations,
people will ask whether black and white soldiers can live and
fight together. As long as being black means being poor and
unemployed, concerned individuals .will question the equity and
legitimacy of disproportionately black armies. And as long as
there is race consciousness, ethnic identification, and the recur-
rent threat or reality of race riots, white doubts about the
loyalty of black troops will remain.
The Armed Forces are periodically perceived by faultfinders
as a place in which "the very poor, the ill-educated, the hapless,
the hopeless, and by some accounts, the incompetent, are paid to
do the defending the rest of us are loathe to do." 178 This per-
ception has helped to push the military closer than ever before
toward a. new system of conscription. "Some critics . . . complcin
that an all-volunteer military will become increasingly unrepre-
sentative of American society," Newsweek notes. And, "if the
178 Richard Cohen, "Draft," Washington Post , 28 July 1981,
p. B-l.
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President's plans for a massive [defense] buildup move ahead on
schedule, a return to the draft seems all but inevitable.
"
x y
New military pay raises, intensified recruiting efforts, a
surge of national pride, a depressed civilian job market (espe-
cially for teenagers) , and other factors have combined to make the
early 1980s an exceptional recruiting success for the All-Volunteer
Force. During the past few years, all Services have either met
or exceeded their active duty recruiting objectives. The "quality"
of new enlistees is better than ever before, along with record-
high reenlistment rates, and with another wave of qualified appli-
cants waiting in the wings. Enlistments of minorities have dropped
considerably, as rising youth unemployment finds whites filling
in for their fellow job-seekers who have lower average test scores
and less education. Ey most accounts, the Armed Forces tapped the
mother lode of qualified volunteers, with practically peak condi-
tions for recruiting and ten years of experience without a draft
to guide the way.
The latest "successes" of the military are described by some
observers as "fragile." They may turn around overnight and arouse
the nation right into a peacetime draft. °° Yet, if any new form
of conscription is ever devised, it will certainly not resemble
the Selective Service of the 1960s. The issues of "representation"
once helped to end the draft; they have recently contributed to
an erosion of support for the volunteer concept; and they will
act to ensure that a reinstitution of compulsory service will
never again allow the sons (and, possibly, daughters) of mere
comfortable American families to hide away behind the convenient
deferments and exemptions of an earlier era.
179
"Why a Draft Seems Certain," Newsweek , 8 June 1981, p. 39.
See also Marvin Stone, "Is a Draft Inevitable?", Editorial, U.S.
Mews & World Report , 13 July 1981, p. 80.
18 For evidence of this feeling, see Goodp aster et al.,
eds., Toward A Consensus on Military Service ; and Jason Berger,
ed., The Mi l itary Draft (New York: The H.W. Wilson Company, 1981).
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The next decade will see the American people struggle to
resolve anew the difficult issues and conflicting priorities that
embrace the demands of national security and go right to the
heart of our national purpose. In the end, it will be the old
philosophical balancing act of benefits against burdens, equal
opportunity against disguised quotas and institutional discrim-
ination, national defense needs against the social role of military
service, the principles cf free choice against government
intrusions into private lives, civil rights against civic responsi-
bilities, and so on through the familiar list of clashing values.
The modern Armed Forces may have an enduring "problem"—but
it will surely not be improved by those who endeavor to reconstruct
the traditional barriers to blacks for "their own good and the
good cf the country." It is perhaps worth noting that blacks and
disadvantaged minorities have been joining the Armed Forces in
unprecedented numbers precisely because it is not a microcosm of
society or "perfect portrait" of the American people. For all cf
its negative aspects and lingering racism, the American military
stands in the forefront of racial integration and equal oppor-
tunity.
Radios and televisions blast forth the message of today's
military: "Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines ... We don't ask for
experience; we give it." "Be all you can be," recruiting jingles
herald, "in the Army . " If all-volunteer recruitment is to survive,
it must learn how to pull, even harder, the capable and qualified
from the community-at-large. The challenge of the late 1980s and
beyond lies also in the response of policymakers to the perceived
demands of population representation; the same demands which, at
once, call for fairness and harmony with American democratic
ideals, and again, for a solid and effective national defense.
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